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ID:
192187
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| Summary/Abstract |
In China, celebrities can dominate public discourse and shape popular culture, but they are under the state's close gaze. Recent studies have revealed how the state disciplines and co-opts celebrities to promote patriotism, foster traditional values and spread political propaganda. However, how do celebrities adapt to the changing political environment? Focusing on political signalling on the social media platform Sina Weibo, we analyse a novel dataset and find that the vast majority of top celebrities repost from official accounts of government agencies and state media outlets, though there are variations. Younger celebrities with more followers tend to repost from official accounts more often. Celebrities from Taiwan tend to repost less than those from the mainland and Hong Kong, despite being subject to the same rules. However, the frequent political signalling by the most influential celebrities among younger generations suggests that the state has co-opted celebrity influence on social media to broadly promote its political objectives.
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| 2 |
ID:
189903
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article challenges the existing scholarship’s characterisation of Chinese liberal intellectuals as Trumpian intellectuals. By conducting a close reading of Chinese academic publications, lectures and opinions aired on social media, this article finds that besides Trump’s Chinese liberal fans, many leading Chinese liberal intellectuals harshly criticised Trump. However, they do not align themselves with American liberals in making all-out partisan criticisms of Trump and American right-wing politics. Instead, their criticisms are mostly centrist. This article argues that Chinese liberal intellectuals’ centrist criticisms of Trump reflect their Confucian, egalitarian and moderate nationalist sympathies, dimensions of their thoughts which have been ignored by existing scholarship regarding them. By exploring Chinese centrist liberal critics of Trump, this article brings to light the ideological heterogeneity within the Chinese liberal camp previously lumped together under the umbrella of “anti-authoritarianism.”
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| 3 |
ID:
186724
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recently, Chinese leaders’ and intellectuals’ use of Chinese history and Confucian tradition to justify the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) one-party dictatorship at home and advance its influences abroad have raised serious concerns and criticisms among China watchers and scholars. However, little attention has been paid to the anti-authoritarian Chinese liberal intellectuals’ reconstruction of Confucianism and Chinese history. This article examines the major reasons and approaches of post-Tiananmen liberal intellectuals’ turn to tradition. It argues that despite their internal differences and lack of rigorous argumentation, liberal intellectuals’ reconstructions of Chinese history and Confucian tradition are mostly intended to justify an institutional restraint on the authoritarian regime and engage in dialogue with different civilizations and refine, rather than replace, the existing liberal world order.
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