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ID:
184753
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| Summary/Abstract |
democracies, the literature has failed to notice their existence in China, let alone theorize or analyze them. We turn to the political science literature on assemblies under authoritarianism to guide our analysis of survey data for 3,008 county congress delegates, half of whom are concurrent ones. We show that dual mandates amplify some voices and not others in ways consistent with two perspectives in the literature. Dual mandates amplify information from citizens at the grassroots upward toward governments: More delegates with deep community roots representing poor, rural, remote districts sit concurrently in county and lower-level congresses. Dual mandates also coopt influential groups posing a potential challenge to ruling party power: They amplify the influence of private entrepreneurs, more of whom sit concurrently in county and prestigious higher-level congresses.
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| 2 |
ID:
184754
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the “selected graduate” (xuandiaosheng) system is not new, Xi Jinping has changed it substantially since he came to power. This paper introduces the concept of the “promotion ladder” to describe how low-ranking cadres must wait longer for promotion than do mid- and high-ranking cadres. This promotion ladder often leads to low-ranking cadres hitting a ceiling in their careers. For this reason, section-level cadres need a fast track that will allow them to “sprint with small steps” (xiaobu kuaipao) if they are to make significant progress in their careers. The xuandiaosheng system not only works as an important means for accelerating the promotion of grassroots cadres but also allows cadre management to start as soon as a prospective cadre graduates from a university. The system introduces flexibility into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) cadre system, allowing it to cope with the constraints of the promotion ladder. This paper will summarize the operation of the xuandiaosheng system under Xi Jinping and discuss its advantages and disadvantages as well as its likely influence on CCP elite politics in the future.
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| 3 |
ID:
184752
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholarship on local governance in China in general and on the Chinese policy process in particular has expanded remarkably over the last four decades. Where earlier studies were mostly interested in grasping the dynamics of central-local relations, more specific features like performance evaluation systems or policy implementation processes have come under scholarly scrutiny over the course of time. New theoretical concepts have been introduced to explain phenomena pertaining to local governance, and this research has become ever more specialized. In this state-of-the art review, we trace the trajectories of research on the Chinese policy process in the reform era in two distinct periods before and after the inauguration of current CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. By drawing on prominent theoretical and conceptual approaches to understanding and assessing the Chinese policy process in these two periods, we highlight the changes and continuities in local policymaking under Xi’s “top-level design.” Although most recent studies indicate increasing top-down centralization in the local Chinese state, it seems that the basic institutional prerequisites of the policy process have hardly been altered. Therefore, most of the older conceptual characterizations of local policymaking still very much hold water. Still, we do conclude by pointing to some so far understudied aspects of local policymaking in China.
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| 4 |
ID:
184751
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper compares and contrasts the behavioral tendencies between civil servants recruited from regular entrance examinations (REEs) and specially selected graduates (SSGs) in grassroots-level governments in China as they face a conflict between vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (public) responsiveness. This study draws on a survey from 13 cities to explore behavioral variations in the two categories of civil servants. Two test methods (the OLS and mediation model) are adopted to verify the findings. This study finds that both the vertical and horizontal responsiveness of civil servants who are SSGs tend to be higher than those recruited from the REEs in facing the above-mentioned conflict. Four personnel mechanisms are tested to explain this variation: (1) the politicized recruitment and selection of SSGs, (2) job arrangements for SSGs, (3) triple leadership over SSGs, and (4) a fast-track stream for SSGs. Our analysis reveals that only the first two can account for this variation. This account can shed new light on the impact of the development of a separate corps of elites in China.
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