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ID:
186969
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| Summary/Abstract |
Deterrence between states is a long-established theory in security studies, but it is rare, if not unique, that an insurgency would deter a state from attacking another country. Insurgencies in the Middle East are increasingly playing an international role, of which deterrence is only a part. This generates an interesting dynamic in which an insurgency uses non-traditional tools to dissuade an adversarial state from attacking the group or country in which it resides. Thus, the research topic is: How is Hezbollah able to deter Israel?
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| 2 |
ID:
192882
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| Summary/Abstract |
Patron states provide their proxies with support for a variety of reasons. To better understand the relationship between states and their proxies, it is important to deconstruct the different means of support. For instance, even after an armed group gains economic and military autonomy, ideological affiliation can be an important factor. The ideological convictions of individuals within an armed group serve as a compass for the actions of the larger group, especially in relations to the patron state. This is the case with Hezbollah. Today, the group has outgrown its dependence on Iran for military and economic support; nevertheless, it remains committed to the ideals of Iran's revolution.
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