|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
174172
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The post-war contradiction between British foreign policy aiming to become a third world power through Europe and the ‘middle of the planet’, and military strategy focused exclusively on an imperial Middle East presence, began to change in 1949. With reduced military resources only the power of prestige (what the rest of the world thinks of Britain) remained. However, by now exacerbating the contradiction between different Middle Eastern foreign policy goals, the Baghdad Pact, having little to do with countering external threats, produced internal conflicts out of its contradictions. Maintaining British middle eastern prestige became crucial just as it was threatened by the US, (disturbed by the imperial problems left by the British, particularly in Egypt) seeking to construct defence arrangements on the Northern Tier. The Baghdad Pact maintained different but equally false claims that a British military presence was necessary to ensure the defence of the Middle East from the Soviet Union. As Anglo-American relations became ones of ‘competitive cooperation’, the military adapted strategy to political needs. Bases for largely non-existent forces, and deceitfully planning to fight a war with nuclear weapons Britain could not deploy were desperate measures to impress middle eastern allies and avoid losing more prestige. The Arab rivalries and divisions the Baghdad Pact exacerbated were eventually to result in Britain becoming involved in military conflict, putting its prestige and influence on the line with more deceit and disastrous consequences for its Middle East influence.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
174173
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to offer a valid answer to the question why Turkey’s official stance on the Cyprus problem experienced frequent shifts - from indifference (1950) into supporting colonial rule (1954) then into Taksim, or partition (1956) and, finally, into independence (1959). Drawing upon the main assumptions of neoclassical realism, it argues that the existing systemic explanations in the scholarly literature that focus on Cold War rivalry are insufficient to grasp why there were such remarkable shifts in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the 1950s. Instead, the article will focus on the domestic dynamics to make better sense of these policy changes. Accordingly, it will first discuss the main assumptions of neoclassical realism as a sound theoretical framework. Second, it will scrutinise in detail how Turkey experienced such shifts in its Cyprus policy throughout the 1950s. Third, the article will discuss the extant literature that overwhelmingly concentrates on systemic explanations for Turkey’s volte-face in Cyprus. In response, the article will offer alternative explanations by focusing on Turkey’s depleting resource extraction capacity and the political leadership of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, in order to fully understand the underlying reasons behind Turkey’s shifting Cyprus policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
174169
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The title of this special issue, Britain, Turkey and NATO, 1945–1960 evolved from a workshop organised by the British Institute at Ankara, and Koç University in Istanbul and held at Koç University on 26–27 September 2019. The seventieth anniversary of the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the stimulus for us to organise the workshop which focuses on Turkish-British relations from the regional as well as global perspective. The articles analyse Turkish-British bilateral relations within the context of the Mediterranean and Middle East regions. They discuss the impact of Turkish-British relations in post-war developments such as the foundation of NATO and the formation of the Baghdad Pact. The role of the two countries in Cyprus is also included.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
174174
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article revises the narrative of the pre-independence troubles in Cyprus to take greater account of Anglo-Turkish interactions. Initial Turkish reluctance to play any role was overcome by the determination of Harold Macmillan as British Foreign Secretary after April 1955 to bring the country into the centre of the picture. The analysis underlines how, far from simplifying any solution, this intensified Turkish suspicions of the motivations behind British policy. These doubts came to pivot on the option of partition in any exercise of Cypriot self-determination. The end-game of Cypriot independence was characterized not by ‘Anglo-Turkish alliance’, but by a fragile Greco-Turkish understanding.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
174168
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The articles in this collection are from among those presented at a workshop held at Koç University, Istanbul, on 26–27 September 2019. This was the fourth and last in a series of meetings held in Turkey and Britain, beginning in 2016, under the title ‘Turkey and Britain, from Enemies to Allies’, which was organised by the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA) and Koç University in Istanbul. Papers from the first and second workshops in the series, ‘Turkey and Britain, from Enemies to Allies, 1919–39′, edited by Daniel-Joseph MacArthur-Seal, were published as a special issue of Middle Eastern Studies in 2018 (Volume 54, No.5). Papers from the third workshop, covering the period of the second world war, are due to appear in a forthcoming number of the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
174170
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
During the transitional period between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 1950s London and Ankara left behind the coolness that had crept into their relations as a result of Turkey’s neutrality during the war and reaffirmed their pre-war alliance. However, the strategic interests the two countries shared did not result in a closer political bilateral relationship. Moreover, before long the British government had succeeded by various ill-thought actions in causing the resentment of their Turkish ally. The respective attitudes of the British and the Turks towards each other were informed by the interplay between material interests and ideational factors against the backdrop of the perceived Soviet threat, Britain’s ebbing power and the rising power of the United States. This study narrates a brief but interesting chapter in the course of Turkish-British relations. It also offers interesting insights into the dynamics of great power/small state interaction.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
174171
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the intricate dynamics of Turkey’s relations with Britain and the United States at a critical juncture during the early Cold War era (1946–1952). The article analyses the implications of a dual transformation of triangular relations in the aftermath of the Second World War. This transformation was on the one hand marked by an ongoing hegemonic transition from Pax-Britannica to Pax-Americana, and on the other hand a systemic transformation resulting in a bi-polar global order. This article utilises levels of analysis framework for a more systematic analysis of the complex web of triangular relations. While focusing on a comprehensive analysis at the international level, the implication of factors at the decision-maker and domestic levels are also examined. The article argues that in response to these drastic transformations as a strategically located regional actor Turkey struggled to strike a delicate balance between its resilient British and newly increasing US ties, while also aiming to institutionalise its Western alliance, leading to NATO membership in 1952.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|