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| 1 |
ID:
187935
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| Summary/Abstract |
Urban governance has been increasingly complicated by the rapid development of emerging industries in recent years. One example is the boom of China's intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) industry, in which governments and business interests are increasingly complicated in co-constructing a context-specific "framework of action" to tap the potential of new industries in managing radical urban development uncertainty. Against this background, this article examines the ICV industries in Hunan Xiangjiang New Area (HXNA), a national new area in Central China's inland province of Hunan. Despite keen competition from coastal cities, HXNA has managed to develop the ICV industry as its flagship sector to propel local economic development. Through tracing the ICV-induced development, this article demonstrates that HXNA's success owes much to a dynamic state–business interaction rarely seen in traditional industrial sectors. To explicate this interaction, this article seeks to move beyond the dichotomy between business-centric and state-centric interpretations of entrepreneurial urban governance to argue that state–business interactions are neither unidirectional nor fixed, but bidirectional, malleable and evolving constantly. Our findings underscore the importance of understanding the entrepreneurial economic landscape as co-shaped by both the state and firms in a temporally dynamic manner.
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| 2 |
ID:
187942
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| 3 |
ID:
187937
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| Summary/Abstract |
Soon after China reportedly achieved the goal of poverty alleviation in most regions ahead of schedule, a campaign of "follow-up check" of the deviations in policy implementation became a key task for local governments from 2019 to 2020. A case study of town H in province M during the "follow-up check" period revealed that local governments at various levels enjoy different authorities in goal setting, inspection, and incentive provision. However, the campaign-styled "follow-up checks" cannot meaningfully overcome the problem of inefficient governance. As the work of poverty alleviation comes to an end, local governments are under time pressure to solve protracted problems, uncertain about whether the higher-level government over them will exercise its authority in inspection and job acceptance. Local governments tend to displace the original goal with new and additional work targets to ensure successful acceptance of their jobs by the upper-level government. This study observes the practice of "follow-up checks" of poverty alleviation and provides an explanation for different governmental behavior taken in campaign-styled governance.
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| 4 |
ID:
187934
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| Summary/Abstract |
State–business relations are important in studying economic restructuring and technological development in emerging industries. Classic debates have centered on a state- or business-centric model to spur innovation. Designated by the Chinese state as a region of innovation, the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area (GBA) has seen the rise of intensive state–business interactions. Our investigation of the National Enterprise Technology Center accreditation policy in the GBA reveals features distinguishing state–business interactions in regional innovation. These interactions are dynamic in the sense that the state and businesses, new technology companies in our case, co-determine and co-constitute policy implementation. Moreover, these interactions are hierarchically differentiated, with their forms and significance varying with the particular level of government involved because each level is accorded capacities and responsibilities of different political-economic importance. We propose that the multi-level governance (MLG) model provides a new and useful perspective for understanding such dynamics. Our results showed that each level of government interacted with technology companies by adopting different strategies. At the same time, businesses adapted their activities with different levels of government to foster partnerships for technological advancement.
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| 5 |
ID:
187939
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's expanding middle class is often found to support the regime and lack democratic aspirations. We find that one section of the middle class depends upon the state for jobs and other material benefits, and the other works for the private and foreign sectors of the country's economy. Once separated as such, we found that the non-state middle class clearly shows lower support for the regime. Furthermore, unlike the state middle class, which registers lower democratic support, the non-state middle class shows a similar level of democratic support as other social classes. In general, however, while only pragmatically accepting the current order, both middle class groups nonetheless appear lacking practical knowledge and understanding of liberal democratic institutions such as free media and multiparty elections. The unforthcoming attitudes toward democracy might also derive from a general sense of fearing the loss of order and the other related uncertainties.
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| 6 |
ID:
187932
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| Summary/Abstract |
Studies of state–firm relations in China have tended to adopt either a state-centric or a firm-centric approach to the research of state–firm relations, leading to a focus on the unidirectional causality from the state to the firm, or vice versa. Moreover, these studies have primarily focused on state–firm relations in traditional manufacturing sectors in a handful of fast-growing cities and regions, leaving a research gap on the interplay between state and business actors in emerging industries and some of the new state spaces of economic development. This special feature presents four articles which examine how state–firm relations unfold in these new sectors and spaces. Their findings show support for a dialectical approach which attends to how the state and the firm co-determine and co-constitute each other's interests and actions.
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| 7 |
ID:
187941
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Extensive literature has documented rural-urban disparities in China. However, rural-urban divide in the lives of sexual and gender minorities has been lesser studied. This article compares lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people's lives in different parts of China, by analyzing a quantitative survey of 16,976 LGBTI people, the largest dataset of its kind to date in China. It was found that LGBTI people living in cities were more likely to display non-conforming gender expression and less likely to endorse internalized homophobia than those living in villages. They were also more likely to indicate that their family members, coworkers, supervisors, and health care service providers showed accepting attitudes and were less likely to report having received negative treatment. A significantly lower proportion of LGBTI people living in Northeast and Northwest China indicated that their family members, supervisors, and coworkers showed accepting attitudes as compared with those in other regions. They were the least likely to come out in the workplace and health care settings. This article contributes to the rural-urban divide debate in China by adding the understudied aspect of sexual and gender minorities' lives to the research literature through providing novel empirical evidence from China.
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| 8 |
ID:
187940
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Why does the government apply different policies to diverse social groups? This study attempts to answer this question by employing a social construction framework and a document analysis to explain the logic underlying housing policies for rural-to-urban migrant workers in China. After documenting the transformation of the social image of migrant workers from "deviants" to "dependents", this study elaborates main factors of change in social construction and discusses how change can affect policy design and distribution of housing benefits. The study finds that, despite a significant improvement in their social image, Chinese migrants still receive few substantive benefits from new housing policies, which are explicitly meant to provide more services to them. Similar to the pattern in western societies, decision-makers tend to offer promises rather than real benefits for well-regarded but politically weak target groups, like the migrant workers. To maintain this allocation pattern, governments adopt such strategies as creaming or symbolic public policy. This study contributes to the policy literature not only by testing the applicability of the social construction and policy design framework in a non-western context but also by unraveling the social and political roots of housing inequality and stratification in China.
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| 9 |
ID:
187933
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Amidst a wave of automation in the manufacturing sector in China and around the world, the robotics industry has gained strength in Dongguan as a locomotive for the industrial upgrading of this "world's factory." Informed by the scholarship of regional innovation systems in general, and the perspective of differentiated knowledge bases in particular, we examine in this article how the rise of Dongguan's robotics industry is mediated by the interplay of the state and firms during their involvement in various attempts within and across the city's boundaries to construct and combine the two knowledge bases required for robotics innovation, namely, analytical and synthetic ones. As our empirical analysis reveals, both the state and firms have initiated actions to enrich the knowledge bases, but neither of them dictates the knowledge dynamics of regional innovation. Rather, their actions are often informed by the interests of, or constrained by the responses from, the other party.
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| 10 |
ID:
187938
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2013 China has established new Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs) across the country to encourage experimentation in economic reform. The objective of the PFTZ policy is twofold: they serve as experimentation grounds for "policy innovation" and further economic development by gradually diffusing reform implementation beyond the PFTZs, and those PFTZs located at border areas promote economic regionalization beyond the Chinese mainland's territory, tying in the "Belt-and-Road Initiative" (BRI). Based on recent fieldwork in the Fujian PFTZ and its three localities, Fuzhou, Xiamen and Pingtan island, this article contributes to our understanding of economic reform and policy experimentation in the era of "top-level design" under Xi Jinping. The authors argue that PFTZ policy achievements have been mostly procedural rather than tackling the core issues of trade, service and financial reform. Moreover, the recentralized policy process has led to dysfunctional results regarding the PFTZ's reform agenda. We also shed light on changing patterns of Taiwanese investment in Fujian in times of frozen cross-strait relations.
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| 11 |
ID:
187936
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study deploys a geoeconomics perspective to explore how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been implemented through economic means by states and firms in China and host countries to achieve strategic objectives. We first use three geoeconomic indicators to classify 74 Belt and Road countries' relations with China and unpack the key geographical features of BRI projects. Then, against this geoeconomics background, we select three BRI projects to explain the roles played by the Chinese state and firms with different ownerships in the BRI's execution. The cases are port development in Sri Lanka by China Merchants Port, a national state-owned enterprise; railway investment and construction in Laos and Thailand led by the Chinese government and state-owned firms; and industrial park development by China Fortune Development, a private developer. We argue that the BRI acts as a geoeconomics maneuver, propelled by a close state-business cooperation that is vital in enabling its success. In forging the BRI, the Chinese state shapes the overall strategic pathway. Nonetheless, it is the firms, both state-owned and private, that are increasingly implicated in co-constructing the project-based and context-specific "frameworks of action" with host countries' governments and business interests to manage overseas economic uncertainty.
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