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| 1 |
ID:
187959
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turkey’s recent democratic backsliding has been profoundly reflected in the near-complete government control of mass media. Pro-government mainstream media, rather than pursuing truth, has engaged in systematic production and dissemination of simulacra. Developed by Baudrillard, the concept of simulacrum can provide insights into the truth and reality perceptions of Turkish voters. This has been a topic widely discussed, given that produced simulacra establish a legitimation framework for the Turkish government’s domestic and foreign policies. Various print and electronic sources are studied to analyse the content of speeches and used techniques. In this study, Baudrillard’s scheme will be applied for the study of three political narratives dominant in the Turkish public sphere: Turkey’s ‘struggle for survival (bekâmücadelesi)’, the projection of key opposition leaders as ‘traitors’, and ideal leadership and diplomacy from past to present through two popular television series, ‘Diriliş Ertuğrul (Resurrection Ertuğrul)’ and ‘Payitaht Abdülhamid (Leader Abdülhamid)’.
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| 2 |
ID:
187947
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sectarian polemic directed at Sunni Muslims in Iran and elsewhere in the Shi’ite world has traditionally foregrounded the historic conflict over and fallout from the Prophetic succession as one of the primary markers of Sunni difference. In contrast to this precedent, I argue that we are witnessing the emergence of a newly formulated parallel discourse in the trajectory of sectarian polemic that is rooted less in such age old concerns and instead couches difference more as a matter of the supposedly problematic contemporary social behaviours of the maligned community. In demonstrating this, I focus on two elements—efforts to associate the Sunni populations at large with fanaticism and violence, and the construction of Sunni Muslims in Iran as hyper-fertile. Drawing on a mixed methodology of media analysis and anthropologically informed ethnographic fieldwork in Mashhad, Iran’s second largest city, this paper concludes by pointing to the origins of this rhetoric in a confluence of the weakening of traditional mythopoetic discourse among the youthful middle-class, their replacement by a new ‘nationalist Shi’ism’, and its subsequent receptivity to a globally circulating anti-migrant and nativist ideology.
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| 3 |
ID:
187953
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| Summary/Abstract |
The intention behind this article is twofold. Firstly, it aims at reviewing the political settings that lead to the second phase (1937–1953) in the formation of the hawza leadership, often ignored by scholars. This period follows the death of the founder of the hawza ʿilmiyya of Qum, Ayatollah ʿAbd al-Karim Haʾeri in 1937, and precedes the 1953 CIA sponsored coup d’état, and includes the appointment of Ayatollah Husayn Borujerdi as the leader of the modern hawza. Secondly, the article assesses the leadership style of the triumvirate of Shiʿa jurists known as marajeʿ thalath, who managed to firmly consolidate the modern hawza of Qum despite the secularizing policies of the Pahlavis which aimed at eliminating the religious sector from the Iranian political scene. In order to understand the course of subsequent developments of the religious establishments and Shiʿi scholars in their attainment of power and influence in Iran in the course of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, it is crucial to investigate the developments during this period. This paper is the first study that draws on a range of primary sources not consulted before to research the political and social contributions of the triumvirate during the period of 1937–1953.
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| 4 |
ID:
187952
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| Summary/Abstract |
Situating the Turkish counterinsurgency within the global context of Cold War counterinsurgencies this article sheds light on counterinsurgency’s provocative and affect-generating techniques and its urban dimensions. I argue that the Gazi incidents of 1995 marked the beginning of a new counterinsurgency strategy in Istanbul that combined overt repressive state violence with urban-centred and affect-generating provocative counterinsurgency techniques in an attempt to quell the growing left-wing mobilization and subvert the Turkish and Kurdish left-wing alignment, which was drawing closer at the time. That new strategy was informed by the principles of the low-intensity conflict doctrine—more specifically, by Britain’s counterinsurgency warfare in Northern Ireland —that came to prevail during the Cold War era. Utilizing a concept I call provocative counterorganization—that is, provocation of individual and communal fear, intercommunal conflict, and ethnosectarian discord by national security states in order to refashion a population’s dissent against the state—I show how provocative counterorganizational strategies work to inform and shape dissent by provoking counterviolence and ethnosectarian discord.
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| 5 |
ID:
187944
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| Summary/Abstract |
While a large body of the literature confirms the existence of diverse styles of the hijab and attributes this diversity as a consequence of religious authorities’ socialization mechanisms across the Islamic world, the literature still lacks sufficiently fresh research-based evidence to assess the actual effects of these official mechanisms on individuals’ perceptions towards the hijab. This crucial research gap is the central focus of this study and I present research-based evidence in this paper to contribute to filling this gap from a demographic perspective. Generally speaking, the results of this analysis have shown that the social perceptions on the hijab are substantially affected by the main demographic determinants. Of them, age composition and education play overwhelmingly a more important role: while the high-educated younger cohorts hold substantially modest and liberal perceptions towards the hijab, the opposite applies to the low-educated older cohorts. In sum, the results of this analysis not only cast a revolutionary doubt on the success of the authorities’ long-term religious bombardment strategy but also argue that such a failure will become increasingly a more visible observation due to the country’s demographics particularly a growing university educated youth bulge fuelled by the global modern communication technologies.
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| 6 |
ID:
187950
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the semiotics and trans-local dynamics of the decision by a Mancunian pizzeria to brand itself using what is widely regarded as a characteristically Islamist internet meme (the so-called ‘R4bia Sign’). The article explores the genesis, genealogy, and development of a salient religio-political symbol as a means to interrogate specific models of cultural production and reproduction. It focuses in particular on the character of meme-making as a mode of political participation and as part of dissident groups’ repertoires of action. In the process, it problematizes contemporary state policy in relation to policing internet-centred discourse among minority and dissident groups. It is particularly critical of indiscriminate interventions which obscure dynamic, reciprocal, and contextual transformations of meaning associated with ostensibly fixed symbols.
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| 7 |
ID:
187960
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study is the first of its own, which provides a semiotic and a discursive analysis of the Saudi animated YouTube sitcom, entitled ‘Masameer’ (the Arabic word for ‘nails-metal spike’). Data were collected from the original YouTube channel of the show (Myrkott) and elaborated on 11 settings which contain three broad categories, namely: traditional treatments, social problems,ideological representation, and gender representations. Cultural signs are explained within Barthes’s (1957) orders of signification to describe each message in three levels of meaning as: denotation, connotation, and myth. Fairclough’s (1989) three-dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis is applied to analyse the underpinning ideologies of the text based on three dimensions of: description, interpretation, and explanation. Lastly, multiple humour theories were used to analyse the humour techniques used in the construction of each setting. The study concludes that ‘Masameer’ contains many cultural-specific signs that require cultural competence in order to elucidate their meanings as well as ideologies which reflect power relations and gender stereotypes. The analysis reveals that ‘Masameer’ is seen not only as an entertaining cartoon comedy, but also as a vehicle for communicating messages, ideologies, and values via humour techniques to poke fun that may stimulate a social change.
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| 8 |
ID:
187948
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article contributes to the debate on the transformation of Islamic activism in a context of political change. Drawing on the case of post-authoritarian Tunisia, it reconstructs and explains the trajectories of Islamists’ participation in civil society during a period of renewed opportunities and intense political conflict. At the crossroads between the literature on Islamic politics and social movement studies, the study discusses how the Islamist actors’ engagement with the associational sphere affects their ideological positions and mobilization capacities. Notably, the article shows how activists engaged in charitable associations have, over time, recast their relations with the party Ennahda, the public authorities and international donors, in order to cope with external pressures arising from a polarized political landscape. Contrary to what could be expected, the change of focus from the political to the associative sphere does not amount to a process of Islamists' de-ideologization, but is rather to be understood as a coping strategy whereby Islamic activists continue to mobilize in conditions where they have some room for manoeuvre whilst Political Islam is difficult to pursue at the party level.
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| 9 |
ID:
187956
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article traces the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) different perceptions of military education from the 1940s to the 2000s and discusses their place in the Israeli military strategy. It first compares the founding principles of Israeli military education with other concepts from around the world, and then examines the changes in the Israeli concept between the 1940s-1970s. Finally, it addresses some of the trends and challenges of the Education Corps from the mid-1970s onwards, which are still relevant today. The historical discussion starts with the educational doctrine of the Palmach, a pre-state military force established in 1941, and culminates in 2004, with the articulation of the military education doctrine in a formal document. The main argument is that the Israeli case presents a unique understanding of military education, which is important not only in historical context, but also in the wider context of the relationship between armed forces and society, and the never-ending question of what motivates the soldier to put his life in danger.
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| 10 |
ID:
187949
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| Summary/Abstract |
Debates on languages have been omnipresent in the Moroccan public space since independence. This article examines the regimes of justification employed by language advocates to approach historically the norms of legitimacy, i.e., ‘the legitimate’. It argues that a new discourse on languages has emerged in 2011 in Morocco employing justice and equity as the main legitimating principles in language politics. After the phases of unity (justifying the Arabization policy, which replaced French by Standard Arabic in administrations, courts, and schools) and recognition (supporting the standardization of Tamazight and its recognition as an official language), the discursive shift to justice and equity in 2011 marks the entry of Morocco in a third phase in language politics and points out a shift in the norms underpinning political legitimacy. The article highlights that the 2011 uprisings in Morocco, though seemingly unsuccessful, did nonetheless provoke an evolution of ‘the legitimate’ in Moroccan politics.
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| 11 |
ID:
187957
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| Summary/Abstract |
For over a millennium, poetry has held a prominent role in the socio-political scene of the Arab world to the extent that it is regarded as a powerful transmitter of a particular ideological worldview. To date, the classical Arabic ode remains an influential vehicle for mobilization among jihadi circles. This study examines modern variants of the classical Arabic ode as an essential factor in the devious and pernicious efficiency of the jihadi propaganda. The article intends to provide a more granular scheme for modern jihadi poetry by discussing the art and function of this genre. By resorting to the discussions about conventional poetic themes, this article demonstrates how modern jihadi poetry works to spread jihadi values and the uncompromising worldview of these groups.
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| 12 |
ID:
187954
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines Britain’s Middle Eastern policy discussions in relation to the future of Kurdistan. It argues that perceptions of the Kurdish question were significantly influenced by the conflicting strategies of the India Office and of the Foreign Office. The primary aim of this study is to examine Mark Sykes’s specific role in determining the future of Kurdistan by neglecting its cause in the post-Ottoman settlement, which has not been considered in the previous literature. Sykes’s views of the Kurds strongly influenced the British policy decision not to recognize the validity of the Kurdish question, and to leave the Kurds off the new map of the Middle East. In addition, this article identifies the role of Orientalist ideology, critiquing Sykes’s perception of the Kurdish question by applying a post-colonial approach primarily based on Edward Said’s theory. It concludes that Sykes’s understanding of Kurdistan was translated into the British policy-making process, both during the war and in the postwar period, which consequently contributed to the post-Ottoman complexity of the Kurdish question to this day.
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| 13 |
ID:
187946
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| Summary/Abstract |
Yāsir al-Ḥabīb is a Britain-based cleric of Kuwaiti origin who aims to establish a religious state in the Persian Gulf region. This article assesses his project as a particular form of Shiite politics, in light of Peter van der Veer’s transnational theory of religious nationalism. It first examines religious conceptions of land in Twelver Shiism to situate Fadak, an oasis on the Arabian Peninsula. Fadak has been “promised land,“ pledged by the Prophet Muḥammad to his daughter Fāṭima. Ḥabīb reverts back to this sectarian trope in his legitimization of a Shiite state but reframes it in the language of religious nationalism. Three nodes in van der Veer’s rendering of religious nationalism guide the analysis: the modern union of the nation’s territorial embodiment with sacred geography, transnational migration enabling larger national identifications, and its “indigenous” crafting. They are traced in Ḥabīb’s British operations, which mobilize local “citizenship” in unbounded sectarian confrontation for the religious “nation,” while cohering paradoxically in the “freedom” discourse of his Shīrāzī Shiism. The epilogue finds heuristic value in Fadakism’s comparison with Zionism, centered on the question of assimilation – in the shape more of outward pressure in the second and elective affinity in the first.
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| 14 |
ID:
187955
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| Summary/Abstract |
Regional disparity is one of the greatest challenges in Tunisia since the Jasmine Revolution. Inequalities between the privileged coastal area and the marginalized interior area are aggravated by the unbalanced regional development policy adopted after Independence from the French Protectorate (1881–1956). However, interregional inequalities were already identified during the French Protectorate era. Thus, this paper discusses the demographic changes in Tunisia in the early twentieth century using population censuses and statistics published in the colonial period to understand the origin of regional inequalities in contemporary Tunisia. The censuses show that population distribution was relatively balanced in the early Protectorate era, but this changed swiftly from the 1930s because of local people’s internal migration to the capital, Tunis. It is assumed that the migration resulted from modernization and the rural exodus. Further study using the censuses of the French Protectorate era and observation of the regional population patterns of that era serves as a key material for understanding the origin of regional inequalities in Tunisia.
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| 15 |
ID:
187943
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the normative positioning of individual EU member states´ domestic interests and the EU´s prioritizing of security and business interests over its values, there is sometimes an overlap making the EU´s relations with the southern neighbourhood complicated. Consequently, it is important to understand how EU leaders assess their interests and what they have done in Tunisia as well as taking note of consistent cooperation and conflict with member states. The aim is to see if the rhetoric is in conformity with the actions or if normative speeches are used for justifying interests. Findings based on interviews with experts as well as content analysis of official documents and media coverage show that there is no policy area where speeches are based on values while actions are based on interests. Secondly, it is confirmed that an increase in interest-based policies at the member state level is associated with a decrease in value-based policies at the EU level, especially in the area of migration.
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| 16 |
ID:
187958
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper makes two main contributions to Safavid-Kizilbash studies. First, it subjects millenarianism of the Safavid-Kizilbash movement, which has been commonly accepted but only briefly mentioned thus far, to analytical scrutiny by using concepts from the millenarian literature. Second, by critically engaging the neo-institutionalist literature, it develops and applies an ecosystemic institutionalist framework that takes ideas seriously to account for the rise and demise of this Sufistic millenarianism. The post-Timurid period constituted a critical juncture conducive to millenarian movements in the Western Asian ecosystem. Facilitated by this favourable climate, Safavid-Kizilbash millenarianism rose on an innovative articulation of ʿAlid Sufism in the Perso-Islamic ideational tradition and tribal corporatism in the Turco-Mongol political tradition. However, the institutional requirements of state building coupled with ecosystemic pressures led the Safavids to drop Sufistic millenarianism in favour of a shariʿa-centric Twelver Shiʿism, leaving the Anatolian Kizilbash as an inward-looking, defensive community under Ottoman rule.
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| 17 |
ID:
187951
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| Summary/Abstract |
Iranian behavior in the Strait of Hormuz (Strat) and the Persian Gulf is Janus-faced, swinging between the embracement of confrontation through calls to close the Strat and a quest for cooperation, which has been exemplified by inviting Arab monarchies to talk. Why is Tehran’s policy in the Strait in such a constant state of flux? Is it just a policy inconsistency or does it signal aspects of the Islamic Republic’s strategic logic instead? Some explanations focus narrowly on ideological motives, hegemonic ambitions, or rogue elements in the IRGC. None of these explanations are satisfactory, however. This paper argues that the Islamic Republic is a reactive actor to threats with a penetrative foreign policy. The dominant role of its leadership’s threat perception has resulted in the use of the power resources in a constant strategic adjustment with shifting threats. These adjustments follow a trade-off between leadership’s confidence in capabilities and wariness of constraints. Such a dynamic explains important shifts in Iranian foreign policy. This article deconstructs Iran’s power strategies and constraints in the Strait as a case study. It shows that while the Islamic Republic’s principal policy in the Strait in a non-existential threat environment favors maintaining the security of the waterway, Iranian leaders leave behind constraint-driven conservatism when existential threats emerge by incorporating the Strait into their deterrence or loss-aversive brinkmanship strategy. Flexible adjustments are perceived in Tehran as an essential tool to guarantee the regime’s survival.
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| 18 |
ID:
187945
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arab uprisings ushered an unrealistic level of euphoria across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); however, ten years on, most of the same dictatorships continue to rule and reactionary forces have only become more powerful. For many, the Arab street has become a more dangerous, even dystopic, place. With democracy curtailed and economic prosperity an unlikely possibility in the near future, some writers and artists in the MENA region are turning away from the nightmares of the present towards the futuristic lands of science fiction and fantasy, imaginary places where they have the freedom to openly reflect upon their predicament. Indeed, it is reported that dystopian literature in Arabic fiction has proliferated in recent years. The same trend can be seen in art: a 2016 exhibition in London billed itself as ‘a dazzling journey into the future of Palestine—through both utopian and dystopian visions of what lies ahead’. In this article, I first briefly detail the recent oppression in Egypt and Palestine—what I call the dystopian present—including against artists and writers. I then look at the contemporary role of art and literature as social critique.
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