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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
002423
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Publication |
Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985.
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Description |
51p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
025102 | 327.47/LAB 025102 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
005830
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Publication |
New York, United Nations, 1995.
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Description |
xvi,287p.
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Standard Number |
9290451033
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Copies: C:3/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
037307 | R 338.926/LOD 037307 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
037308 | R 338.926/LOD 037308 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
D37308 | R 338.926/LOD D37308 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
124770
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
China has largely been cut off from direct transfers of military systems and technologies since the announcement of the EU arms embargo in 1989. Nevertheless, the EU and its member states remain a major source of high technologies for China, namely, by means of trade, investment, and scientific cooperation. This is mainly because the EU-China relationship continues to be dominated by the economic interests of individual member states, both in trade and increasingly in investments. Furthermore, due to a lack of direct security interests in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans do not generally see China as a security threat or a strategic competitor. Therefore, the EU has so far failed to develop a strategic approach toward the potential security implications of transfers of European militarily sensitive technologies that goes beyond the existing arms embargo and currently lacks effective mechanisms to control the flow of such technologies to China.
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4 |
ID:
006631
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Publication |
London, Brassey's, 1995.
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Description |
vii, 424p.
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Standard Number |
1857531248
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
038387 | R 355.405/CEN 038387 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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5 |
ID:
006855
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Publication |
New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1995.
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Description |
xx, 410p.
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Standard Number |
8122004156
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
037150 | 355.825119/FRA 037150 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
D37150 | 355.825119/FRA D37150 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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6 |
ID:
002814
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Publication |
Amsterdam, VU University Press, 1992.
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Description |
xxxix, 406p.,tables
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Standard Number |
9053581037
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
034448 | 355.82/BRA 034448 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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7 |
ID:
148218
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Summary/Abstract |
China’s defense science, technology, and industrial system has been undergoing a far-reaching transformation over the past two decades and the single biggest factor behind this turnaround is the role of external technology and knowledge transfers and the defense industry’s improving ability to absorb these inputs and convert into localized output. China is pursuing an intensive campaign to obtain defense and dual-use civil–military foreign technology transfers using a wide variety of means, which is explored in this article.
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8 |
ID:
074787
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a number of serious concerns that space and missile technologies-including weapons-related technologies-might be exported by Russia and Ukraine to states that might use them for hostile purposes. In fact, inadvertent contribution to ballistic missile programs through space collaboration and technology sharing is considered one of the major "routes" of missile technology proliferation. Incidentally, in the case of Russia and Ukraine, out of all the potential risks associated with technology transfers, proliferation of ballistic missile technologies has been the major concern for the Western nations, and engaging these two countries in joint space projects has been viewed as a powerful incentive to comply with missile nonproliferation norms and ideals.
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