| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars of Intelligence Studies have extensively debated the contours of an ideal relationship between intelligence services and policy making, in which agencies can maintain analytical objectivity while having a policy impact. However, this debate has not meaningfully embraced a geographic expanse covering the Global South. This article, firstly, addresses this by offering a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence–policy relationship in India during the Nehruvian era. Secondly, it draws on the existing scholarly examinations of the global intelligence–policy relationships and argues that ‘proximity’ produces varying results in different decision-making cultures. Thirdly, the article contributes to the literature on contemporary Indian security by examining the impact on Indian intelligence of the relationship between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and B.N. Mullik, former chief of Indian intelligence and an understudied personality. It challenges the popular perception surrounding Mullik’s ‘sycophancy’ and argues that the decision-making culture that existed during the Nehruvian years demanded greater proximity, subservience and, in the worst case, sycophancy. A cost-benefit analysis presented in the article reveals that there were both pros and cons to the ‘proximity’ factor, with the former being more significant.
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