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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
188196
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| Summary/Abstract |
In their ambitious article, Joshua Alley and Matthew Fuhrmann ask how “alliance commitments affect US military spending.” Their answer: each alliance, on average, adds $11–$22 billion to the annual defense budget. Given the number of US defense pacts, that would mean formal alliances accounted for over $735 billion of the 2019 defense budget.1 This finding, if true, suggests that Donald Trump was right to claim that alliances are “much too costly for the US.”2
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| 2 |
ID:
188195
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union tried to induce North Korea to drift away from China. This challenged China’s security, given escalated tension between China and the Soviet Union in this period. To counter the Soviet policies, China used binding strategies, which are a state’s attempt to maintain or enhance its alignment with its security partners. I argue that China chose coercive binding as its primary strategy because it had strong leverage over North Korea. Meanwhile, China deployed accommodative binding to complement its primary strategy. In this article, I first develop a theoretical framework to explain how a state chooses its binding strategies. I then apply this theory to the Chinese-North Korean-Soviet triangle in the late 1960s. I conclude by discussing broader theoretical and policy implications, such as the importance of examining how states mix different types of binding strategies.
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| 3 |
ID:
188191
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| Summary/Abstract |
In civil wars, unpopular and violent rebel organizations sometimes gain support from politically motivated constituencies who should, by outside appearances, logically oppose such groups. I explain this through a logic in which self-interested, insincere rebel leaders pander to aggrieved civilian populations to mobilize them, presenting the rebel organization as empathizing with and offering solutions to popular grievances. Leaders exploit an information asymmetry about their true preferences to gain allegiance using cheap sociopolitical appeals, rather than more costly material incentives or coercion. I inductively develop the theory through a case study of Renamo in Mozambique and then probe the generalizability of the logic through case studies of the Nicaraguan Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, drawing on interviews and archival materials. This article explicates a previously undertheorized phenomenon in the study of rebel mobilization and demonstrates how apparent popular, voluntary support for rebels can be more tenuous than it appears.
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| 4 |
ID:
188194
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| Summary/Abstract |
When do rebel groups transform into successful political parties? I argue that rebel successor party electoral performance is strongly shaped by rebel social bases and organizational cohesion. When rebels recruit more from the civilian population and control more territory, they are more likely to have a postwar base of party members and attract nonrebel elites to join their party. I also argue, however, that cohesive rebel organizations adapt more easily to the challenges of party building. Two key mechanisms link cohesion to success. First, cohesive rebel organizations are more likely to preserve their wartime social bases and avoid rebel leader splits and defections to other parties. Second, cohesive groups are better suited to incorporate nonrebel elites and pursue electoral strategies that appeal to noncombatant voters. This article examines the validity of this theory in a comparative study of the party-building efforts of ethnic Albanian rebel organizations in the Balkans.
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| 5 |
ID:
188193
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| Summary/Abstract |
Private military and security companies (PMSCs) and mercenaries are a common feature in civil wars, yet little systematic analysis of PMSC involvement and conflict dynamics exists. This article explores whether civil conflicts that feature PMSC forces in combat are more likely to recur. We contend that the presence of PMSCs in fighting exacerbates the postwar credible commitment problem, as belligerents will be concerned about the possibility to redeploy such forces in the future. Belligerents pay more attention to more recent and more visible information, meaning that the effects should be greatest if PMSCs feature extensively in combat and at the end of the conflict. A duration analysis of data from the Private Security Events Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1990–2014, offers robust support for these claims. Our results suggest that conflict management should consider aspects beyond the local context as risk factors for civil war recurrence.
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| 6 |
ID:
188192
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do women insurgents affect rebel organizations’ structure and survivability? Scholars acknowledge the importance of organization-level dynamics and unit composition for conflict outcomes. However, our understanding of how gender-diverse cadres influence rebel survivability remains limited. I examine the mechanisms through which women sustain armed conflict. I analyze micro-organizational dynamics of rebellion through a qualitative case study of the Kurdish armed movement in Turkey between 1982 and 2015 based on the official archives of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. I show that women insurgents enable tactical diversity, aid the organization’s coup-proofing strategy against factions, and mobilize domestic and international audiences. Women contribute most to their organization during crises and due to exploitation of gender inequalities. Analyzing the relationship between gender dynamics, group structure, and evolving rebel strategies, this study shows that the gender composition of the membership is an important factor influencing rebel survivability.
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