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| 1 |
ID:
188171
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea and the involvement in the war in Donbas, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have all marked the return to active Russian participation in separatist regions in the ‘near abroad’. They took the international community by surprise. To be sure, the Russian Federation had played a role in all previous secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet space. Nonetheless, Moscow’s post-2008 bold actions – open invasion, recognition of separatist regions and annexation of a neighbour’s territory – have marked an innovation in Russia’s foreign policy. This points to questions about how Moscow is legitimising these actions and whether the official narrative suggests a change in Russia’s strategy towards secessionist conflicts in the ‘near abroad’.
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| 2 |
ID:
188169
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| Summary/Abstract |
In reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese authorities have installed visa restrictions and strict quarantine rules to prevent foreigners from spreading new infections to the country. This has disrupted a trend of increasing European Union (EU)-China travel and socio-economic exchanges. EU citizens living in or travelling to China have had to deal with the consequences of Beijing’s so-called Zero-Covid strategy. In view of quasi-closed borders, many Europeans have given up on living in or travelling to China. Those who have stayed have come up with strategies of adaptation, while European-owned firms have reacted by adopting initiatives such as doing business online or localising staff. Overall, the Chinese visa restrictions have added a new dimension to the debate on asymmetries in EU-China relations.
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| 3 |
ID:
188168
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| Summary/Abstract |
An analysis of South Korea’s independent deployment of the Cheonghae Unit to the Strait of Hormuz sheds light on the fragmentation of media and political discourses in the country. Empirical evidence from five major South Korean newspaper outlets reveals that the South Korean government’s pre-emptive securitisation presents a wide gap in manifest and latent security interests between the state and society. Securitisation is debated with regard to the two interconnected questions of South Korea’s military deployment to the Middle East and the future of the Korean Peninsula – both of which are ultimately tied to the question of Seoul’s commitment to the US alliance.
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| 4 |
ID:
188167
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whereas Japan’s hedging vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific has predominantly been the focus of academic analysis, hedging also explains Tokyo’s policy choices in the Gulf to a significant degree. Yet, existing literature has largely overlooked Japan’s hedging behaviour in the Gulf, which had to navigate the uncertainties generated by two competing powers, the United States and Iran. As hedging theory is above all concerned with risk, Japan’s policies demonstrate a concern with managing risks and the adverse consequences of misalignment or alignment. Tokyo’s attempts to serve as what former Foreign Minister Kono Taro called an “honest broker”, however, have not enabled it to shape the evolving regional security architecture. Japan’s propensity to deploy hedging more effectively in the Gulf may be shaped by domestic political considerations, pressing security challenges closer to home and personalities of key Japanese politicians such as late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.
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| 5 |
ID:
188172
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| Summary/Abstract |
The idea of ‘Europe’ in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has evolved significantly during the three decades of post-communist transition. Initially, anti-Soviet elites from the 1980s portrayed the region as equal/complementary to the Western part of the continent, which for its part perceived CEE as its ‘Other’. The first decade of post-communist transition was marked by a switch to nationalist thinking and the evocation of the idea of ‘Europe’ as one of nation-states. Finally, contemporary discourses of ‘Europe’ in CEE revolve around three different pillars, that is, European exceptionalism, European universalism and Transatlanticism, in contrast to Western discourses.
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| 6 |
ID:
188170
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| Summary/Abstract |
Portugal has a longstanding relationship with China and has benefited from the economic opportunities arising from closer economic ties with Beijing, especially in the wake of the 2011 international bailout and external assistance programme. Lisbon wants to do as much business with China as possible. On the other hand, the United States (US) is Portugal’s most important ally. Thus, Lisbon has found itself caught between conflicting great-power interests. Amid rising US-China tensions, Lisbon has become a battlefield for both states’ geostrategic political ploys. Portugal needs to navigate complex partnerships as the European Union (EU) lacks a consistent foreign and security policy towards China. Lisbon needs to strike a balance between the unfailing commitment to the US and loyalty to the EU on the one hand, and the economic relationship with Beijing on the other.
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| 7 |
ID:
188166
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Persian Gulf regional security complex is shaped by intense competition between regional states and, since the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, US military preponderance. US security cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council member states has sustained a status quo that has allowed extra-regional countries to advance their interests without making significant contributions to regional stability. An examination of the presence of five Asian countries (China, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea) in the Gulf suggests that, as the US signals intentions to reduce its security commitments to the region, the perception of hegemonic retreat will influence the regional policies adopted by these Asian countries. A further and related consideration is the ‘great-power competition’ narrative that is driving politics at the systemic level. The US-China bilateral relationship will have a significant impact on extra-regional powers’ approach to the Gulf.
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| 8 |
ID:
188173
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| Summary/Abstract |
Analyses of the Libyan conflict from the 2011 revolt onward have tended to define it as a ‘proxy war’, especially because of the relevant role played by foreign actors and their intermingling with various local factions. However, this definition does not stand up to closer examination and definitely does not fit with the specifics of the Libyan case. Through a combined analysis of the three theoretical concepts of ‘areas of limited statehood’ (ALS), ‘rentier state’ and ‘proxy war’, after an examination of the role played by militias, economic institutions and external actors in the conflict, it is argued that the classic concept of proxy war does not fully apply to the war in Libya.
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