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| 1 |
ID:
188286
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines whether policies alone are sufficient to foster change in diversity and inclusion in the Australian and New Zealand intelligence sectors. It considers the diversity and inclusion policies of Australian intelligence agencies as well as applicable legislation regarding employment and nondiscrimination, as the legislation informs policy and is intended to reflect societal values. By comparing the Australian and New Zealand approaches to diversity and examining the successes and failures of their differing policies, this article reveals which policies have been most effective in fostering change in representation and equality and proposes alternative solutions based on other diversity and inclusion practices, such as mentorship, sponsorship and parenting outreach programs, and flexible working options.
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| 2 |
ID:
188285
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| Summary/Abstract |
The implementation of equality and antidiscrimination strategies in Polish intelligence and counterintelligence institutions has lagged behind the rise in the number of female functionaries serving in them. Women in the Polish secret services are exposed to systemic prejudices and stereotypes that are rooted in a patriarchal mentality and in so-called muscular thinking. The underrepresentation of women in top management and leadership positions continues to be a barrier for women seeking careers in military and civilian agencies. Due to the hermetic and hierarchical character of such institutions and the predominance of men in them, organized promotion of gender diversity is very important. This is nonetheless related to the issue of tokenism, which leads to the informal isolation of women and to role encapsulation. The position of women in a male-dominated environment is undermined by the behavior patterns established by culture and the biological features attributed to the female body and to femininity. Changes have been initiated by women networking in Polish security institutions, but this is a gradual process.
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| 3 |
ID:
188293
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the limitations of purely defensive cyber operations continue to be demonstrated in the continuing pressure of hostile cyberthreats, the U.S. government has introduced new doctrine to shape countercyber operations (CCO) leveraging offensive options to degrade threat capabilities and infrastructure. Planners have only begun to understand the broader implications of these new concepts in difficult periods of crisis. The article explores the parallels to other strategic early warning and intelligence capabilities, surfacing distinctions based on the unique dynamics of cyberconflict to identify scenarios in which CCO successes may prove potentially destabilizing and lead to greater escalation risk.
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| 4 |
ID:
188287
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| Summary/Abstract |
The vast majority of intelligence history focuses on operations and executive decisionmaking rather than attending to, among other topics, analytical work or day-to-day organizational activities in the full (hierarchical) breadth of agencies. Especially in the studies on the Cold War period, one of the major implications of this research focus is that women, in so far as they are not part of top leadership or critical to operations, are excluded from analysis. This article argues that, during the Cold War period, security and intelligence services were constructed as a masculine profession. The article advances three professional standards that were constructed as masculine: a sense of responsibility, female support, and full-time availability. Empirically, this research focuses on the Dutch Security Service (in-depth interviews and archival research).
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| 5 |
ID:
188292
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| Summary/Abstract |
Some discussions of cyberattacks paint them broadly as low cost and widely available, failing to distinguish cyberattacks by difficulty. However, as the literature has long recognized, cyberattacks are not all alike. The most sophisticated attacks require greater capabilities, including noncyber capabilities, that are commanded by only by a handful of states. Assessment of the difficulty of cyberattacks therefore requires a broader view of a cyberattack than a view focused on gaining and maintaining unauthorized access to a computer. The proposed Cyber Effects model of a cyberattack looks to the ultimate effect sought by the attacker, which may be focused only on gaining access to a device or may seek access to produce a cascade of external effects. This model can then be used as a conceptual model to organize factors that bear on attack difficulty for assessment.
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| 6 |
ID:
188282
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the advent of new technologies and the accelerated changes in the security arena, it has become apparent that intelligence organizations need to develop learning, self-reflective, and competitive working environments and communities of practice with a distinct set of values and norms that may go beyond the cultural values and practices of the twentieth century. One of the values that needs to be further explored and integrated is diversity. A look at the literature and policies in the field shows that in certain parts of the world, consistent steps have been made toward investigating the implications of diversity and inclusion as setting goals for reconceptualizing human resources and internal culture strategies. This introductory study aims to introduce readers to the current debates on diversity and inclusion, as well as offer a short glimpse at the question.
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| 7 |
ID:
188290
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| Summary/Abstract |
IJIC’s initiative to dedicate a full issue to challenges and progress in ensuring diversity and inclusion (D&I) in intelligence services from various continents is a welcome and timely initiative. To be sure, a zeitgeist of D&I policies emerged since the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001—which has paved the way for efforts toward diversifying intelligence agencies throughout the world. Nevertheless, despite progress, countries have yet to achieve a de facto and de jure routinization of D&I practices vis-à-vis intelligence. Much needs to be done toward effectively diversified intelligence, which, like intelligence transformation, involves a continuum of concerted, multi-faceted, political and institutional processes—a rather onerous task in intelligence agencies’ heavily bureaucratic environments.
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| 8 |
ID:
188283
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence organizations need a workforce that draws on a variety of perspectives, as do other types of organizations. The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) was created to address the conflict situations of the last century. The early workforce reflected the requirements of that time; it had strong ties to the military, was of primarily European heritage, Judeo-Christian morality, was righteous about democracy, and mostly male. Today’s security problems extend well beyond situations of state conflict, to include transnational crime, crises of the natural environment, and other fluid issues that defy the previous expectations. National security intelligence workforces must be both knowledgeable and agile. This combination of knowledge and mental agility is, paradoxically, difficult to achieve. The heritage of the IC created modes of thinking that are at odds with the current need to imaginatively consider interconnected factors and various perspectives. The IC is stymied by its own culture, structures, processes, policies, and thinking patterns. Increased inclusion of diverse points of view will better enable assessment of complex, dynamic global issues. This article discusses mental frameworks as they affect intelligence work, drawing conclusions about the value of diversity in an intelligence and national security workforce.
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| 9 |
ID:
188291
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| Summary/Abstract |
By the outbreak of World War II, French intelligence services had accumulated encyclopedic knowledge of Germany’s military establishment. France, for example, had an embedded mole in secret German communication centers who supplied high-value intelligence for more than a decade and gave vital Enigma encryption secrets to the Allies, and it had another formidable agent who unmasked German spies and “turned” officers in Abwehr, Germany’s principal spy agency. German intelligence boasted of penetrating the Deuxieme Bureau, France’s most important intelligence service, and secret sessions of the Senate. In truth, neither France nor Germany could hardly conceal secrets from one another. France’s success in intelligence, however, has been obfuscated by the ignominious Fall of France in a few short weeks as well as France’s failure to anticipate the audacious German attack through the Ardennes. Arguably less a shortcoming of intelligence, this failure was more a question of France’s leadership and its colossal inaction against the German Western Offensive.
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| 10 |
ID:
188288
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| Summary/Abstract |
Like most formal organizations in the United States, the agencies in the Intelligence Community (IC) have historically comprised white men and reflected their stories and interests. In the last few decades, however, the agencies have made efforts to diversify the workforce along multiple dimensions of inequality. In response to these initiatives, researchers—to include the agencies themselves—have sought to understand and elevate the experiences of officers who identify outside of the white and male demographics, with race, ethnicity, and gender as the primary targets of these studies. In contrast, it is only in the last few years that the agencies have made efforts to increase the visibility and sense of belonging among the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex, asexual or ally, and other sexual and gender minorities (LGBTQIA+) population in the IC. LGBTQIA + intelligence officers work in a career with a particularly fraught history: it began with the so-called Lavender Scare in the 1950s—a period during which gay and lesbian government officers were considered security risks—and it was legal for them to be fired for this reason until 1995. With a short history marked by rapid change, research on this population has been relatively slow and scant to date. What do we know about the experiences of LGBTQIA + intelligence officers, and where do we go next? This article will consider these questions and explore opportunities and challenges that the structures and cultures of the IC present to the LGBTQIA + population.
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| 11 |
ID:
188284
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| Summary/Abstract |
The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has executed a set of initiatives to enhance workforce diversity and inclusion to broaden the array of mindsets, perspectives, and skills in support of the mission. However, public statements and unclassified IC documentation indicate that progress is not keeping pace with objectives, as recruitment among sociodemographic minorities lags and departures outstrip that of nonminoritized groups. Research including U.S. intelligence officers conducted in the 2020–2021 timeframe suggests insight into these shortcomings by way of misaligned perspectives that diverged along group lines between core mission professionals, compliance officers, and institutional leaders. These perspectival misalignments suggest a need for more cross-group collective solutions that better reflect the experiences of intelligence officers in targeted groups.
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| 12 |
ID:
188289
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| Summary/Abstract |
Female intelligence refers to a gender-sensitive perspective in collection planning that not only recognizes women as targets of collection but also considers females as operatives. These considerations become especially relevant in paternalistic cultural contexts, such as Afghanistan. Potential obstacles (e.g., myths) for female intelligence as well as past attempts at implementation (e.g., female engagement teams) are reviewed, before four areas of concern are identified that must be addressed in the future. The analysis is expanded by presenting survey and interview data from a sample of Bundeswehr operatives with human intelligence experience in paternalistic countries. We suggest how to address existing concerns and increase the actionability of field human intelligence units by incorporating females as valuable assets on both sides of the military intelligence collection process.
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