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| 1 |
ID:
188274
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most interesting thematic areas in intelligence studies is the study of the activities of the numerous double agents that had a significant impact on events and processes in the history of human conflicts and wars. Being a double agent is a highly demanding activity on both personal and professional levels. Examining the Cold War archives of former communist secret policies in Poland and Croatia, the authors integrated data showing that Ante Jerkov, an Italian journalist of Croatian origin with a parallel Ustasha and communist background, was an agent of influence and a source of information for at least five different intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. He worked for several agencies simultaneously. Additionally, he participated as part of a more comprehensive network of journalists who offered and sold information to different secret services in Rome/the Vatican during the Cold War. This article is a short biography of Ante Jerkov and his life in intelligence lies and deception.
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| 2 |
ID:
188276
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| Summary/Abstract |
The increasing tension in international politics during the Cold War increased the importance of intelligence services throughout the world. Security services on both sides of the Iron Curtain were an important tool for gathering information on the enemy and for destroying political opponents. Moscow and its allies readily used their secret services for their purposes, both international and domestic. During the Cold War, the State Committee for Security (KGB) tightened its links to intelligence and counterintelligence services of the Soviet Bloc (SB) countries. One example of such cooperation is the joint operation of the KGB and the SB—Security Service of the Polish People’s Republic—in the 1970s and 1980s, called Operation Kaskada, and its subset, Operation Kama. The KGB and SB actions focused on compromising expat activists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and on finding their allies in the USSR and Poland. The strategies used by both intelligence services led to closing a courier route from the West into the USSR and to seizing a contingent of documents that Moscow then used expertly for its propaganda and political ends. Given its efficacy, the operative model used by the Soviet intelligence agents is in all probability still used by Russian intelligence and counterintelligence services.
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| 3 |
ID:
188278
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How much influence did the former communist state security service Darzhavna sigurnost (DS) have during the transformation period in Bulgaria? For the first time in history, there is empirical data available that allow for an analysis of the role of the Bulgarian secret police and its “afterlife” after 1990. Bulgarian intelligence archives, which were made partly accessible following the country’s admission to the European Union in 2007, provide an excellent basis for an analysis of the relationship between the DS and the Soviet State Committee for Security, the transformation of the Bulgarian security apparatus in 1990, attempts to disclose the state security archives, and continuous infiltration of Bulgarian politics, institutions, and security apparatus by former agents of the communist intelligence and security apparatus. The empirical data suggest that personal connections, dependencies, and informal networks of former DS agents and officials played an important role during the transformation period in Bulgaria and are at least partly responsible for political corruption, continuous Russian influence, a high degree of politicization of the Bulgarian security apparatus, misuse of intelligence and illegal surveillance practices, and a high degree of domestic and international mistrust and (dis-)loyalty.
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| 4 |
ID:
188273
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| Summary/Abstract |
From the time of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, many Polish Jews emigrated there, seeking shelter in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the circumstances of growing anti-Semitic attitudes. Lucjan Levy/Levi was one such emigrant who left Poland and settled in Israel. He soon joined the Shin Bet counterintelligence service, even as he remained an asset for Polish intelligence, providing Warsaw (and the intelligence services elsewhere in Eastern Europe) with valuable information on Israeli counterintelligence activity. Now, drawing on recently declassified documents, the author reconstructs Levy’s intelligence performance while also examining his espionage career within the broader framework of human intelligence operations conducted by Poland’s Tel Aviv Station.
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| 5 |
ID:
188275
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Cold War, the USSR (Soviet Union) and the United States were in a state of permanent political and thus information and psychological competition, conducted using various methods and forms of military and nonmilitary influence. This article analyzes doctrinal and textbook models of operational disinformation application from the counterintelligence service standpoint. Disinformation as a technique and tool of operational work was used in the area of intelligence influence within the operations and games conducted by the special services of the USSR. Still, it was also used in active operational combinations carried out by the State Committee for Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR counterintelligence. The author’s thesis is that operational disinformation had a significant impact on the activity and effectiveness of the Soviet defensive services, and these methodologies are still in the arsenal of the Russian Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, and Main Intelligence Directorate.
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| 6 |
ID:
188277
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| Summary/Abstract |
This archival study focuses on secrecy, Soviet disinformation campaigns, and active measures designed to divert the attention of the international community from the 1986 Chernobyl accident, and to conceal state mismanagement, violence, and inefficiencies of the Soviet Union nuclear industry. More specifically, it illuminates the implications of the Soviet cover-up operation and its ultimate failure, particularly due to the efforts of the American intelligence community, including the CIA. American technological progress and intelligence were instrumental to the CIA’s understandings of the damage caused by Chernobyl, the dynamics of decontamination and its ethnic discriminatory practices, as well as the extent of the Soviet disinformation campaign. Importantly, Soviet active measures designed to obscure the scale and the consequences of the disaster had the opposite effect from what was expected, helping the American intelligence community accurately predict the potential political crisis in the USSR exacerbated by the Soviet cover-up operations and state violence. American analysts argued that popular concerns about the violent nature of the Soviet regime and discriminatory draft and decontamination policies would persist, amplifying ethnic tensions in Soviet republics. In hindsight, their analysis had profound predictive value.
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| 7 |
ID:
188280
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Republic of Serbia has been an independent state since 2006, after the separation of Montenegro, which for the first time in modern history (since 1918) led to the need for all intelligence and security services, which previously had belonged to various state communities within Serbia, to be reconstituted as Serbian national services. In creating the Serbian intelligence and security system, there was a lot of wandering, unclear solutions, and misunderstandings—understandable given the historical and political context in which the creation of the system took place. The Serbian intelligence and security system consists of three services coordinated by the Coordination Bureau, which belongs to the National Security Council. The Serbian security intelligence system will undoubtedly go through many transformations in Serbia’s accession to the European Union. With this article, we have tried to present the current solutions in this system, which represent the basis for further transformations and adaptation of the system to the needs of modern Serbian society.
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| 8 |
ID:
188281
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| Summary/Abstract |
After dissolution of the State Security (StB), which had served to keep the communists in power, a new system of intelligence services was needed as a pillar of the new democratic society. Changes in structure, policies, and personnel were accompanied by ardent disputes, mostly centering on the counterintelligence services. With the Cold War drawing to an end and the bipolar world beginning to disintegrate, intelligence work seemed redundant. Activities against countries that became Czechoslovakia’s partners after 40 years of the Cold War were halted, and ties with its patron, the State Committee for Security (KGB), were severed. The diplomatic cover that intelligence officers had used for years was now seen as unacceptable, which meant that the service suddenly lost its stations abroad. The initial period of major changes and restructuring in 1990 was followed by routine operations starting in 1990–1991, which was relatively calm and lasted until the breakup of the Czechoslovak Federation. In spring 1993, the Czech Intelligence Council was established to ensure oversight of the Intelligence Community, and the foreign intelligence service gradually improved its relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first transformation stage and the factual establishment of the Office for Foreign Relations and Information were completed by passing the Act on Intelligence Services in July 1994.
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| 9 |
ID:
188279
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| Summary/Abstract |
Declassified archive documents from the Ministry of the Interior in Bulgaria were used to examine and analyze the subversive activity of U.S. intelligence against Bulgaria conducted via the scientific exchange of these two countries. These documents expose Bulgarian intelligence and counterintelligence’s interest, methods, means, and approach with the United States during the Cold War. Although U.S. researchers and scholars represented only a small portion of the U.S. citizens temporarily residing in Bulgaria, they were considered the most dangerous because they had access to the Bulgarian cultural and scholarly elite, hence the opportunity to exert political influence on it.
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