|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
188456
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After Vladimir Putin declared a partial Russian mobilisation in late September 2022 and annexed four additional Ukrainian regions, there was little to suggest that a negotiated settlement would be possible while he remained in power. This article instead explores three possible military outcomes of the war – an outright Ukrainian or Russian military victory, and a war of attrition. As of November 2022, a Ukrainian victory, so unlikely at the outset of Russia’s invasion, is a distinct possibility, provided the West offers sufficient military materiel and training swiftly enough. Russian forces have suffered heavy casualties and are low on precision-guided munitions, with their logistics under fire and having lost much of what air dominance they had. Hence, Moscow’s battlefield fortunes hinge on whether mobilised, poorly trained and equipped forces will be able to hold defensive lines over the winter to buy time to build new, more capable units, with troop morale ever more crucial, but also brittle. A key unknown, however, is the state of Ukrainian forces. Importantly, the scale and intensity of the war, the vital interests at stake and international involvement on both sides all gravitate towards a more drawn-out war over the winter and beyond.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
192137
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Attrition has been both Ukraine’s and Russia’s primary approach at the tactical level. Ukraine’s preferred way of war centres on the use of artillery fire to facilitate decisive attritional effects on the opposing force, which it then exploits with manoeuvre. This is not unexpected, as most major conventional wars feature attrition as well as manoeuvre and reconstitution. Western assistance has brought Ukraine to an impressive point, but may not yield a fires advantage for Ukraine sufficient to ensure further operational breakthroughs or strategic gains. Advanced Western weapons, such as the US-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), have not allowed Ukraine to avoid attritional combat, particularly in its counter-offensive in Kherson. Even with more effective wide-scale combined-arms training and precision strikes, as contemplated, future Ukrainian gains are likely to be incremental and costly unless the Russian military significantly misspends combat power in its own offensive operations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|