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| 1 |
ID:
188661
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and security policy. Abe’s agenda, which is increasingly called an ‘Abe Doctrine’, has prompted considerable debate as to its true nature. Is the Abe Doctrine nationalist, revisionist, or realist? This article contributes to these debates by tracing the competing characterizations of an Abe Doctrine’s policy ideas and assessing these against the doctrine’s policy prescriptions. It argues that the Abe Doctrine–situated within the long-term evolution of Japanese policymaking – is chiefly realist rather than nationalist in its policy prescriptions. In fact, where the doctrine does constitute a major departure from past policy practice, largely unrecognized until now, is not so much in how it expands Japan’s international role but in how it narrows this role. The underlying logic of the Abe Doctrine may therefore be pushing Japan towards a new form of regional realism.
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| 2 |
ID:
188659
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We study Chinese attitudes toward the United States, and secondarily toward Japan, Russia, and Vietnam, by analyzing social media discourse on the Chinese social media site, Weibo. We focus separately on a general analysis of attitudes and on Chinese responses to specific international events involving the United States. In general, we find that Chinese netizens are much more interested in US politics than US society. Their views of the United States are characterized by deep ambivalence; they have remarkably favorable attitudes toward many aspects of US influence, whether economic, political, intellectual, or cultural. Attitudes toward the United States become negative when the focus turns to US foreign policy – actions that Chinese netizens view as antithetical to Chinese interests. On the contrary, attitudes toward Japan, Russia, and Vietnam vary a great deal from one another. The contrast between these differentiated Chinese views toward the United States and other countries, on the one hand, and the predominant anti-Americanism in the Middle East, on the other, is striking.
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| 3 |
ID:
188666
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent studies revisit the debate over whether tourism promotes peace via intergroup contacts. In this article, we examine the case of China-Taiwan confrontation and argue that the increase of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan contributes to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Specifically, the touristic experiences and interactions with Taiwanese improve Chinese people’s understanding of Taiwan, fostering a patient and peaceful attitude toward the prospect of cross-Strait relations. With the survey data collected during July and September 2013, we find that Chinese people who were visiting Taiwan for the first time were less likely to support a rapid pace to the unification between China and Taiwan or unification by force than those who had never visited Taiwan. Additionally, the attitude is stronger among independent tourists than those who came in escorted tour groups. Our findings suggest that contacts between tourists and locals are effective in alleviating political tension across the Taiwan Strait.
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| 4 |
ID:
188664
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What are the prospects of U.S.-China relations in the area of human rights? Skeptics maintain that human rights is no longer an issue between the United States and China. A traditional understanding of U.S.–China relations ignores the role of norms, while the constructivist perspective recognizes their independent effects. This paper links the traditional understanding of power politics between the United States and China with the study of constructivist norm research. The three findings of constructivist norm theories are relevant and applied to predict the status of human rights in U.S.-China relations: the historical construction of norms, the long-term and multifaceted effects of norms, and the persistence of norms. Based on these theoretical predictions, it is expected that, although convergence is not completely impossible, the past dynamic of competition and confrontation will continue and human rights will still be a contentious issue in U.S.-China relations.
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| 5 |
ID:
188665
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rise of China and how other countries respond to China’s rising is widely studied. But little has been done on how other countries reacted to the rise of China throughout history and how China strategically interacted with them. The conventional wisdom holds East Asian international relations did not operate in the Westphalian way and China’s rising in history did not trigger regional balancing actions. In this article, we challenge that view. We argue East Asian international relations were not exceptional to basic rules of the Westphalian system. Each time China rose up, it triggered balancing actions from neighboring regimes, including nomadic empires and settled kingdoms. The neighboring regimes would accommodate China only after they were defeated by China or pro-China regimes propped up in these countries. The Chinese hegemony in East Asian history could not be taken for granted. Over last 2,000 plus years, only during three periods of time (the Qin-Han 秦汉, Sui-Tang 隋唐, and Ming-Qing 明清 dynasties) China could successfully overpower regional resistance and enjoyed a stable tributary relationship with neighboring states. In the rest of time, the Chinese state could not retain hegemony in East Asia.
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| 6 |
ID:
188662
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines a US security client’s decision to support an international institution led by a challenger to its patron’s leadership position in the international system. Two factors together shape the client’s decision: (i) the nature of the institution led by the challenger and (ii) the position of the client in the regional security environment. I argue that a challenger-led institution that aims to complement rather than compete with the institutional framework of the US-led order is likely to be supported by the client that is only facing a diffused security concern from the challenger. In contrast, the challenger’s institution that is designed to compete with US-led institutions will not be supported by the client that is facing a specific security concern from the challenger. This argument is substantiated by case studies of Japanese and South Korean responses to two China-led institutions between 2014 and 2016.
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