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ID:
192556
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| Summary/Abstract |
One year has passed since Russia invaded Ukraine. Significant incongruity is apparent in Russia’s actions, such as changing the purpose of the war and attempting to gain public support by positioning the war as a fight against the West. Russia’s actions appear to be opportunistic. However, considering Russia’s actions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it appears that Russia heightened its anti-Western awareness in response to the actions of the West and escalated its responses to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, this article focuses on US moves toward the countries of the former Soviet Union after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and examines what provoked Russia. It then analyzes whether Russia’s actions are reactive or proactive and provides indications for understanding future developments in Russia.
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| 2 |
ID:
188887
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a resurgence of policy attention toward reassurance—an attempt to increase an ally’s feeling of security from external threat. In our recent article, “Trivial Tripwires? Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance,” we assess how states can most effectively reassure their allies. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on the interaction of capability and resolve, and test it using case studies and data from original expert surveys. We find that in northeastern Europe, high-resolve signals (for example, tripwire forces) are not viewed as any more reassuring than high-capability, low-resolve signals (for example, forces stationed offshore). Put differently, high resolve cannot offset low capability.
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