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| 1 |
ID:
192931
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the mid-2010s Turkey-Russia relations gained a strategic dimension after the two nations began to work together in Syria and took bold steps to cooperate on defence and nuclear energy. This development was commonly regarded as a major shift in Turkish foreign policy. This article argues that the context in which the Turkey-Russia nexus operates is historically rooted. Since the nineteenth century, Russia almost has been the most critical threat to Turkey; and Turkey consistently sought to moderate this threat, mostly with Western assistance. But when Turkey either failed to subdue Russia or there was no significant threat, it would opt for rapprochement with Russia. An examination of the historical background of Turkey-Russia relations helps explain these nations’ contemporary dynamics with one another.
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| 2 |
ID:
188902
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains Turkey’s hard power usage in Syria, Azerbaijan, and Libya. We argue that gaining a respected status forms the basis of Turkish foreign policy and the main cause of Turkey’s hard power usage was the failure of Turkey’s previous status-seeking strategy. Turkey had followed a cooperationist strategy since the early 1990s by pursuing membership in the EU, strengthening ties with the West, and leading regional mediation efforts. However, this strategy failed due to the changing the security environment in the early 2010s and the discord between the interests of West and Turkey. This led Turkey to be more prone to using hard power, through which Turkey could achieve status and influence in multiple regions. This study provides an insight into the status-seeking strategies of Turkey, as an emerging middle power, by unpacking its priorities and contributes to the ongoing debates on Turkey’s foreign policy under Erdoğan.
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