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| 1 |
ID:
189223
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently in the throes of redefining itself as not just China's ruling party, but also as the dominant political force of global China. Following the path of Chinese globalisation, this project overlaps with – but is different from – China's much maligned strategy of influencing and interfering in the society and politics of other countries. The principal aim of the CCP's global extension is not to meddle in the affairs of other countries, but tying Chinese people, goods, money, business, and institutions that have ventured abroad back into the strategy and domestic system of China and the CCP. The article shows that China's emerging superpower is informed both by China's unique pattern of globalisation and the CCP's own understanding of the nature, aims, and modalities of its rule, which can only partially be compared to those of earlier superpowers.
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| 2 |
ID:
189221
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated its centenary, its expanding role in penetrating, regulating, and reshaping social organisations (社会组织, shehui zuzhi) seemed to signal a decisive shift in not only the arrangement, but also the balance, of power between the state, the voluntary sector, and the party in favour of the latter. Beginning with the recent reform “decoupling” professional associations and chambers of commerce (行业协会商会, hangye xiehui shanghui) from state management, which has been cited in official documents as a model for “separating the state from society” and an initial step in further reducing the state management in other realms of activity, this article considers broad trends in the CCP's historical relationship with social organisations, particularly alongside its shifting relationship with the state apparatus after 1949, over time. Working through both the CCP's governing practice of “documentary politics” and, more recently, initiatives to expand “rule by law” under Xi, I argue that the party has vastly increased its power, presence, and control over both as it marked its centenary, albeit at times donning the mask of the state to do so. I conclude that the party's continued advance under Xi is occurring at the expense of both the autonomy of the state administration and that of social forces.
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| 3 |
ID:
189222
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The Xi era can be characterised as an ambitious and nationalistic one. Aims such as rejuvenating the Chinese nation and fulfilling the country's historic mission to be a great, rich country are often referred to in elite leadership discourse and state produced propaganda. “China Dream” is amongst the most important slogans used in this language. In terms of the context in which this phrase occurs and the actual deployment, it is one that carries broad connotations and implications about an era where, in ways similar to politics in the West, issues around identity are key, and the important thing is to feel, not just to believe. “China Dream” is a form of language that speaks into the public's deeper instincts and sentiments.
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| 4 |
ID:
189218
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| Summary/Abstract |
By tracing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 100 years, this special issue brings to light the organisation's contradictions, setbacks, and changes in direction, together with its long-term evolution. Taking a step back from the current focus on the historical juncture of the twentieth CCP Congress, and on Xi Jinping himself, our long-term approach contextualises recent developments. Looking at the CCP's evolution over time shows how the founding structures and objectives of the CCP have had a long-lasting impact on its future developments as well as how they have been tweaked and rearranged to adapt to the new economic and social environment the party contributed to creating. Our long-term historical approach stresses impermanence beyond the apparent permanence of the party's concepts (e.g. “loyalty” and “democratic centralism”), discursive tactics (e.g. the mobilisation of emotions) and on-the-ground practices (e.g. grassroots party building), while also bringing to light the mere recycling of past practices and strategies.
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| 5 |
ID:
189219
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| Summary/Abstract |
There has always been a lack of democratic life in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Former CCP Secretary General Hu Jintao attempted in the first decade of the twenty-first century to promote reform, including a revision of the party constitution, aimed at enhancing “intra-party democracy” (党内民主, dangnei minzhu). However, Xi Jinping has put on hold this plan, fully restoring the verticality of the institution where it may have been weakened. This article has three objectives. First, it compares the successive versions or iterations of the CCP constitution in the last 100 years and analyses all the changes related to democratic centralism, elections, and democracy that have been introduced. Then, it assesses Hu's reforms and their failure. Finally, it explains why the CCP cannot reform and democratise as long as it remains a party-state and China remains a one-party system.
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| 6 |
ID:
189220
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| Summary/Abstract |
While changes in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recruitment are generally described as different phases focused on recruiting either “reds” or “experts,” giving more or less weight to political or technical criteria, we instead stress the importance of changing understandings of political loyalty to examine these evolutions. By tracing these changes throughout the party's 100 years, we show that how the party understands loyalty is largely strategic, detached from a purely ideological approach. The CCP has alternatively approached loyalty in ascriptive terms, based on class background, and behavioural ones, looking at active displays of loyalty or passive obedience. The level and form of activism expected from party members and cadres have also dramatically changed over time. Relying on recruitment data, this article shows that it is paradoxically during periods of party expansion that the CCP becomes more politically demanding with its members.
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