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| 1 |
ID:
190288
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| Summary/Abstract |
Bipolarity is no longer returning—it is here, and it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. News today is dominated by US-China relations, indicating a recognition of today’s bipolar system, and China continues to close the gap in the economic realm. The effects of this bipolarity have substantially deepened as elites in both Washington and Beijing have become aware of the new global structure and are acting accordingly. Structure and beliefs are amplifying each other.
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| 2 |
ID:
190285
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the rise of Chinese power and North Korea’s nuclear development alter East Asia’s strategic landscape, American foreign policy analysts continue to look for innovative ways to bolster the security position of US allies in the region. MIT political scientists Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels highlight one potential option in a recent article in The Washington Quarterly, arguing that the United States should revitalize its alliances with Japan and South Korea by exploring “the wartime sharing of nuclear weapons,” which might involve “modifying hardware (e.g., certifying allied F-35s for nuclear delivery), acquiring new systems, and training air or naval crews in tactical nuclear strikes and command and control.”Footnote1 Similar proposals are not difficult to encounter in Washington’s policy community. One analysis calls for the “custodial sharing of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities during times of crisis with select Asia-Pacific partners, specifically Japan and the Republic of Korea [ROK].”Footnote2 Likewise, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Brad Roberts writes that “[a] more NATO-like nuclear umbrella makes good sense in Northeast Asia today.” Such arrangements “could be replicated in South Korea,” for example, “with US nuclear weapons permanently deployed there along with dual-capable fighter-bombers that would be flown by pilots from both countries.”
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| 3 |
ID:
190289
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| Summary/Abstract |
Chinese nationalism has been driven from two directions: by the state from top-down and by populist forces from the bottom-up. For many years, Chinese nationalism was driven more by the need to survive as a country (affirmative) than driven by big power ambition (assertive), because the communist state made effective efforts to control the expression of popular nationalism that was more emotional and hostile to Western powers. Making use of nationalism for regime legitimacy, the communist state took a pragmatic attitude to make sure that Chinese foreign policy was not dictated by the emotional rhetoric of popular nationalism, which would have damaged cooperative relations with Western powers and Asian neighbors that China’s economic success depended heavily upon after the Cold War.Footnote
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| 4 |
ID:
190291
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| Summary/Abstract |
Should the United States commit to defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese attack? Should Washington extend to Taiwan something like NATO’s Article V mutual-defense promise or America’s solemn vow in Article V of the US-Japan Treaty to protect Japan against foreign aggression? Unlike those other treaties, Washington no longer has treaty pledges or any other kind of formal status in its dealings with Taiwan and does not even recognize Taiwan as a country. For four decades, under a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” the United States has refused to tip its hand, declaring instead that any decision on whether to use military power in defense of Taiwan would depend upon how a conflict began. Such deliberate muddying of the deterrence waters has had an unredeeming legacy from Korea to Kuwait and beyond. For Taiwan, however, such a policy has enjoyed support for four decades.
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| 5 |
ID:
190286
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| Summary/Abstract |
The role of artificial intelligence (AI) in military use has been the subject of intense debates in the national security community in recent years—not only the potential for AI to reshape capabilities, but also the potential for unintentional conflict and escalation. For many analysts, fear that military applications of AI would lead to increased risk of accidents and inadvertent escalation looms large, regardless of the potential benefits. Those who are concerned can cite a plethora of potential ways things can go awry with algorithms: brittleness, biased or poisoned training data, hacks by adversaries, or just increased speed of decision-making leading to fear-based escalation.
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| 6 |
ID:
190282
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US military withdrawal process from Afghanistan brought politicized accusations of multiple foreign policy—military, intelligence, and diplomatic—miscommunications and misconceptions. Notably, however, critics (from Congressional members and oversight committees to members of the military, intelligence, and diplomatic communities) stop short of considering the drawdown a failure to implement domestic law—specifically, the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 (WPS Act) and the US Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS Strategy). This omission from the ongoing political debate demonstrates that—despite the United States in the late 2010s being “the first country in the world with a comprehensive law on WPS, and de facto, the first with a whole-of-government strategy that responds to such a domestic law”Footnote1—its government and security communities have not yet fully integrated critical WPS concepts and theories or understood their practical applicability for US security and policy decisions.
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| 7 |
ID:
190284
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In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States captured the world’s attention with a technology and capability-sharing partnership known as AUKUS. For many, this was yet another example of the closeness of the alliance between the United States and Australia, which was initially formalized in the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), from which New Zealand was suspended in 1986. Yet, however strong the public narrative seems, American and Australian officials have expressed concern and confusion about each other’s behavior in recent years, and well-connected scholars have warned of “complacency” and “expectation gaps” while identifying divergences in the interests, behavior, and outlook of the United States and Australia.Footnote1
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| 8 |
ID:
190283
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, US policy toward Russia has combined elements of principled pragmatism, selective engagement, and containment. This at times self-contradictory approach by successive US administrations has left the United States without a sustainable policy toward Russia, oscillating repeatedly between euphoria and despair. The Biden administration has inherited this approach and a poisonous partisan atmosphere in Washington. Thanks to President Trump’s fixation on “getting along” with Russian leader Vladimir Putin and the swirl of Russia-related investigations during his presidency, Russia policy became excessively personalized and de-institutionalized. The Biden team has indicated that they believe that the foundations of Russia policy needed a complete overhaul as well as a reappraisal of what has and has not worked since the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014.
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| 9 |
ID:
190290
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| Summary/Abstract |
China is significantly expanding the size and sophistication of its nuclear forces. Over the summer of 2021, researchers using satellite imagery discovered three separate fields of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos under construction in the deserts of north-central China.Footnote1 If each silo is eventually equipped with a missile, the Chinese nuclear arsenal capable of striking the continental US could triple in size. The US government estimates that China’s nuclear arsenal could number 1000 warheads by 2030, with at least 200 deployed on long-range platforms.Footnote
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| 10 |
ID:
190287
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| Summary/Abstract |
Today, we enjoy the privilege of a global economy in which the design and use of government money is largely uncontested. But this status quo is not guaranteed. In fact, the stability of this consensus is in jeopardy amid the current transition to an increasingly digital economy, complete with digital currencies. Governments across the world are currently building their own digital fiat currencies, which are digital versions of existing government money, and some of these projects look radically different from today’s fiat paper money (e.g., the US dollar). Notably, the United States, a long-time skeptic of the race for government digital currencies, has recently entered the fray with promises to deliver a prototype design, which would establish the function and features of a digital dollar for feedback by individuals and organizations, through its research with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).Footnote1 While governments are moving quickly to move from prototypes to final versions, little action yet exists at the most important frontier of this issue: coordinating standards and designs for digital currencies across countries.
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