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| 1 |
ID:
190663
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Indo-Pacific region has become a central focus of great power competition. Not surprisingly, a rising China seeks to play an important, if not a leading role in the transformation of Asia’s present regional order. The United States, meanwhile, as the unipole, has strong incentives to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Facing certain structural and domestic constraints, China is disinclined to resort to the strategy of violent revision or subversion historically pursued by previous rising powers. Instead, China has pursued a gradual change of the existing regional order through a combination of internal balancing and external reassurance strategies. Specifically, China’s quest for great power status in the region, particularly in response to the Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the United States since the Trump administration, has prompted its proactive shift to counterbalance the US’ vision of order in the region. This paper argues that the balance of power and the balance of alignment constitute two key variables that affect the prospect of Sino-US competition for a preferable regional order. Beijing’s balancing strategies have significantly enhanced its economic and military capabilities, reducing the gap with the United States on the one hand and attracted certain regional states to join China-led regional initiatives on the other. However, owing to the complex balancing dynamics in the region and the agency of small and middle powers, the balance of alignment supports neither American nor Chinese dominance of Asia. Contrary to the ‘new Cold War’ narrative, the contest for order does not entail dividing the region into two rival blocs, but rather creating certain overlapping groupings and coalitions led by the two great powers. It consequently also signifies that the current order transition under a new bipolarity will be prolonged and relatively stable compared to the Cold War bipolarity.
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| 2 |
ID:
190668
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Managing order transition in the Indo-Pacific is as much about negotiating the character of regional order as it is about mounting balance of power challenges or establishing countervailing institutional arrangements. For this reason, members of the Quad have expressed ambitions to deliver shared security on the basis of collective identity and values—though at times more in discourse than in practice. This article argues that India is actively contesting and, in some ways reconfiguring, the legitimating narratives of the Quad as an Indo-Pacific ‘security community’. Under the leadership of Narendra Modi, India has approached the socialising imperative of liberal identity cues selectively and ambivalently. More widely, India has declined to pursue an overt, collective strategy of Chinese containment and has propounded distinctive visions of regional security provision. India’s vision for liberal order in the Indo-Pacific stands apart from the ‘security community’ that the other Quad partners have enunciated in their foreign policy discourse, with consequences for the future of order transition in the Indo-Pacific.
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| 3 |
ID:
190667
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Indonesia regards the shift in the center of economic gravity to Asia, marked by the rise of China and India following the earlier Asian tigers, as a welcome phenomenon that can benefit its own economic development. However, while celebrating the economic dynamism of the Indo-Pacific region, Indonesia also views with great concern China’s assertiveness in pursuing its claims over the whole of the South China Sea, as well as the re-emergence of major power rivalry, particularly between the United States and China as the incumbent and ascending superpower respectively, which can disrupt regional stability and prosperity. With its ‘free and active’ foreign policy doctrine Indonesia adheres to non-alignment, and as a matter of principle does not take sides in any great power competition. Indonesia’s policy in managing regional uncertainty which offers both opportunities for cooperation and threats of conflicts can best be described as hedging plus to ensure both its strategic autonomy and agency. It entails engaging all sides to maximize benefits while mitigating risks at both the national level and through ASEAN. At the same time, as the world’s largest archipelagic state straddling the Indian and the Pacific oceans, and the largest member of ASEAN, Indonesia carries out middle-power diplomacy by playing a leading role in promoting ASEAN-centric inclusive and cooperative wider East Asian multilateralism, helping to shape both the institutional and normative pillars of the International Order in the Indo-Pacific.
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| 4 |
ID:
190669
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This article analyzes the UK government’s response to international order transition as seen through its recent foreign policy ‘tilt’ toward the ‘Indo-Pacific’. It suggests that in post-Brexit Britain the determinants of foreign policy are increasingly complex involving an attempt to balance domestic policy, manage internal party conflict and establish an “independent” position in international relations in the context of US attempts to build a “grand alliance” against China. Our central argument is that the UK policy shift toward the Indo-Pacific is informed in large part by a changing dominant narrative on China and in particular by perceptions of China as “systemic competitor” in the global political economy. We argue that not only is the “tilt” at this point in time based on rather questionable assumptions regarding the UK’s relationship with the ‘region’ but that ‘international order transition’ is more complex than is suggested by the new UK policy orientation. Limited in terms of conventional military power, the UK tilt strategy focuses on effecting institutional and normative change and positions the UK as a ‘soft power superpower’ alongside the United States in the region. In the context of renewed international political and economic crisis the “tilt” expresses the contradictions that lie at the heart of UK foreign policy rather than offering a clearly defined and viable new orientation for “global Britain.”
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| 5 |
ID:
190662
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The world is changing, and the liberal international order (LIO) is at stake. Scholars and pundits hold different views on whether and how an order transition will take place. We argue that the divergent arguments around LIO are rooted in contested conceptualizations of what an international order is as well as the untheorized measure of what counts as a ‘transition’ of international order. We propose a synthesized and deductive approach to defining international order with three pillars: power, institutions, and norms. We argue that a significant order transition will take place when at least two pillars of the order are fundamentally challenged and eventually changed. Applying this deductive, three-pillar conceptual framework of international order, we preliminarily examine how US-China competition has impacted the current LIO in the Indo Pacific. We conclude that the multi-pillar feature of the international order technically strengthens the sustainability and resilience of the current LIO. Even though China’s rise might change the power distribution in the system—the power pillar of the order, the mere power shift between China and the United States will not lead to a significant order transition if the other two pillars of the order remain intact.
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| 6 |
ID:
190665
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although Japan is commonly regarded as a strong proponent of the existing liberal international order championed by the US in the Indo-Pacific, sometimes it has been half-hearted in opposing a Sino-centric order and been rather supportive of Chinese diplomacy. In particular, it has to some degree supported the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by Beijing, effectively offered its endorsement to the international legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) without problematizing human rights issues, and severely restricted the enhancement of its own defense capabilities. These policies have been shaped by pro-China individuals and groups who hold privileged positions inside the government, and their privileged positions have been determined by haphazard domestic political factors which have little to do with Sino-Japanese relations. This means that, although on the surface Japan may seem to have rationally calculated its international strategic interests and implemented hedging as a coherent strategy amid Sino-US rivalries, its implementation of what seems to be a hedging strategy has actually been incidental. Its policy has turned out to resemble what has been regarded by International Relations (IR) theorists as a hedging strategy, due to haphazard domestic political factors.
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| 7 |
ID:
190661
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The world is in crisis. The Covid pandemic and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war signify a potential order transition in the international system. The Indo Pacific is at the center of gravity of great power competition between the US and China. How have policy elites in the region perceived the potential order transition against the background of US-China strategic competition? How have states, including both great and secondary powers, chosen different strategies to cope with security and economic turbulence in the Indo Pacific? This special issue intends to shed some light on these questions by critically examining the diverse perceptions and policy choices of the United States, China, South Korea, India, Japan, Indonesia, and the UK during the period of potential order transition in the Indo Pacific. It provides an academic platform for scholars to engage in this ‘order transition’ topic from different theoretical perspectives as well as from respective national angles in the Indo Pacific. It suggests that the complexity of the international order itself has made the ‘order transition’ more complicated and difficult than before. It is the best of times, it is the worst of times, and it is the most challenging time for state leaders and scholars alike.
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| 8 |
ID:
190664
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay examines four schools of thought about US strategy in Asia, particularly regarding China. These four viewpoints—here termed the responsible stakeholder, communist collapse, constructive cooperation, and managed competition schools—are determined largely by the answers to two questions. First, to what degree should US policies focus on integrating China into the international order, versus mitigating the consequences of China’s rise? Second, should US policy makers seek a specified end state with China, or simply focus on achieving a stable steady state? Based on a detailed analysis of existing commentary, we assert that most debates about US objectives vis-à-vis China revolve around these questions. This essay concludes that US policies are likely to incorporate aspects of all four theories, which will make it difficult—if not impossible—for the United States to adopt any clear and sustained strategy across administrations. Barring a major breakthrough or breakdown in US–China relations, Washington is destined for a muddled debate on China that will make it difficult to achieve strategic consensus. And this strategic confusion on China will have substantial implications for US regional strategy more broadly.
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| 9 |
ID:
190666
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| Summary/Abstract |
The liberal security order in the Indo-Pacific led by the US has been transitioning to one managed by a US-led security network. As a result, the geostrategic competition between the US and China has also been transforming to one between this US-led network and China. In the process, Japan, Australia, and India have emerged as major ‘nodes’ of the network. In this context, this paper adopts the concept of ‘network power’ to claim that South Korea—while it still favors being a part of the network—is concerned that it would be relegated to the status of a small peripheral node mainly ‘tied’ to Japan, the regional hub of the network in Northeast Asia. To mitigate this concern, South Korea attempts to avoid unnecessarily seeming to exclude China while still favoring the network; aligns with other regional nodes in the network, whether Australia, India, or some ASEAN states; and increasingly frames its role as that of an active ‘order-shaper’ rather than a passive ‘order-taker’.
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