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1 |
ID:
062159
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2 |
ID:
050644
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Publication |
Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004.
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Description |
ix, 215p.
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Standard Number |
0520232976
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
047761 | 320.540951/GRI 047761 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
067958
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4 |
ID:
064982
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5 |
ID:
097555
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Publication |
London, Routledge, 2010.
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Description |
xiv, 279p.
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Series |
Routledge Asia's transformations series
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Standard Number |
9780415564021, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
055071 | 951.06/GRI 055071 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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6 |
ID:
098305
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Publication |
London, Routledge, 2010.
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Description |
xix, 279p.: ill.pbk
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Standard Number |
9780415564038
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
055194 | 951.06/GRI 055194 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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7 |
ID:
092263
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Chinese and Korean protests over "revisionist" Japanese histories of World War II are well known. The impact of contested Chinese and US histories of the Korean War on US-China relations today has received less attention. More broadly, there has been little research seeking to systematically explore just how history textbook controversies matter for international relations. This article experimentally manipulates the impact of nation (US/China), of source (in-group/out-group textbooks), and of valence (positive/negative historical narratives) on measures of beliefs about the past, emotions, collective self-esteem, and threat perception in present-day US-China relations. A 2 × 2 × 2 design exposed randomized groups of Chinese and US university students to fictional high school history textbook accounts of the Korean War. Findings reveal significant effects of nation, source, and valence and suggest that the "historical relevance" of a shared past to national identities in the present has a dramatic impact on how historical controversies affect threat perception.
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8 |
ID:
072474
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
Rejecting the certainty of prediction in favor of a probabilistic approach to forecasting, this paper develops an eight-step forecasting methodology, addressing 1) structural drivers, 2) predetermined elements, 3) critical uncertainties, 4) chance, 5) scenarios, 6) probabilities, 7) signposts, and 8) policy implications, and applies it to the medium-term future of US-China relations. Specifically, it forecasts a 45 percent chance that US-China relations in 2015 will be best characterized overall by a rivals scenario, followed by a 35 percent chance that the US and China will be partners. The chances that the US and China will be allies or enemies are significantly more remote, but real, at 5 percent and 15 percent respectively.
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9 |
ID:
087735
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Historical controversies continue to plague northeast Asian politics today, with Chinese and Koreans protesting Japanese history textbooks and Japanese politicians' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and Koreans protesting Chinese claims that the ancient Kingdom of Goguryo was Chinese, not Korean. Yet, there is little empirical research exploring what, if any, impact historical beliefs have on threat perception and foreign policy preferences in northeast Asia today. On the basis of surveys of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean university students, this paper explores the relationships among beliefs about the past, perceived threat in the present, and foreign policy preferences for the future. Results and their implications for northeast Asian security are discussed.
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10 |
ID:
137799
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Summary/Abstract |
IN A SERIES OF ARTICLES AND A BOOK ON THE ISRAEL LOBBY, realist international relations theorists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argued in 2006–2007 that America's virtually unqualified support for Israel was damaging the U.S. national interest. “Now that the Cold War is over, Israel has become a strategic liability for the United States,” they argue. “Washington's close relationship with Jerusalem makes it harder, not easier, to defeat the terrorists who are now targeting the United States.”1 America's disastrous Middle East policy, they further contend, is best explained by the pernicious influence of the “Israel lobby” in Washington, especially wealthy Jews and the right-wing American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
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11 |
ID:
095865
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper explores the impact that increased exposure to China during the two and a half weeks of the Beijing Olympics had on American attitudes towards China. A large N longitudinal survey revealed a significant increase in negative attitudes towards China from the beginning to the end of August 2008. Statistical analysis revealed no dominant explanation for this change, however. Instead, personality (openness), ideology (social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism), and media exposure each had a small impact on changing attitudes. Further research (including a follow-up experiment manipulating the valence of media coverage of China) suggested both the possibility of an 'efficiency effect', whereby China's very success in both hosting and competing in the Olympics generated increased American anxiety about China, and a 'cheating effect', whereby stories about underage Chinese gymnasts and deception (e.g. lip synching while another child actually sang during the Opening Ceremonies) diffused broadly through social networks, uniformly and negatively impacting American attitudes towards China.
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12 |
ID:
103981
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
What is the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, how does it differ from American patriotism and nationalism, and what impact do they have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes? To explore the structure and consequences of Chinese national identity, three surveys were conducted in China and the US in the spring and summer of 2009. While patriotism and nationalism were empirically similar in the US, they were highly distinct in China, with patriotism aligning with a benign internationalism and nationalism with a more malign blind patriotism. Chinese patriotism/internationalism, furthermore, had no impact on perceived US threats or US policy preferences, while nationalism did. The role of nationalist historical beliefs in structures of Chinese national identity was also explored, as well as the consequences of historical beliefs for the perception of US military and humiliation threats.
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13 |
ID:
143784
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Summary/Abstract |
2012–2013 witnessed a renewed flare-up of anti-Japanese sentiment in Mainland China, followed by a toughening of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Diaoyu Islands policy. Did popular nationalism influence the PRC’s military escalation? A lack of transparency in elite Chinese decision-making puts a definitive answer to this question beyond our reach. However, this article utilizes qualitative and quantitative analyses of anti-Japanese discourse and deeds in both cyberspace and on the streets of urban China to argue that the circumstantial evidence is compelling: nationalist opinion is a powerful driver of China’s Japan policy. The demands of nationalist legitimation appear to pressure the elite to respond to popular nationalism. Should one or more Chinese die at the hands of the Japanese navy or air force, therefore, the popular pressure for escalation and war will likely be more than China’s leaders can manage.
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14 |
ID:
086665
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
China's relations with the West deteriorated dramatically following the Tibet and Olympic torch relay controversies in the spring of 2008. Because of its focus on the balance of material power, realist International Relations theory can do little to help us understand such developments. Instead, it is the political psychology of international relations that provides the most leverage on the role that misperceptions play in generating mistrust and insecurity in U.S.-China relations.
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15 |
ID:
134971
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Summary/Abstract |
Based on a 2011 national survey, I argue that while US conservatives feel somewhat cooler toward the East Asian democracies than US liberals do, they feel much cooler toward China. Greater average conservative than liberal prejudice lingers, cooling attitudes toward the “Yellow Peril” of all Asian countries, but communism is a larger source of ideological differences over China. For cultural, social, economic, and political reasons, conservatives feel substantially cooler than liberals toward both communist countries in general and “Red China” in particular. I conclude by suggesting that with gerrymandering and ongoing ideological sorting, these ideological differences over China on Main Street may come to play a greater role in the making of US China policy.
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16 |
ID:
064498
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17 |
ID:
053301
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Publication |
New York, Routledge Curzon, 2004.
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Description |
xv, 263p.
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Series |
Asia's transformations
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Standard Number |
0415332044
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
048446 | 306.0951/GRI 048446 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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