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| 1 |
ID:
197926
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2025.
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| Description |
xviii, 268p.: tables, figureshbk
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| Standard Number |
9788198837011
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 060877 | 358.3882/LEL 060877 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
| 060878 | 358.3882/LEL 060878 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
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| 2 |
ID:
197925
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2025.
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| Description |
xiii, 196p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788198445889
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| Accession# | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 060875 | 623.3/UPA 060875 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
| 060876 | 623.3/UPA 060876 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
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| 3 |
ID:
197924
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2025.
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| Description |
xxi, 337p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788198748461
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Circulation
| Accession# | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 060873 | 355.42/CHI 060873 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
| 060874 | 355.42/CHI 060874 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
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| 4 |
ID:
197923
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| Publication |
Oxon, Routledge, 2025.
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| Description |
154p.pbk
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| Series |
Adelphi Paper ; 516
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| Standard Number |
9781041101321
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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| 060872 | 355.033052/WAR 060872 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
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| 5 |
ID:
197922
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2025.
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| Description |
xvi, 370p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9788198445803
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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| Accession# | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 060871 | 355/IND 060871 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
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| 6 |
ID:
197921
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| Publication |
New Delhi, ICWA, 2025.
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| Description |
92p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9789383445899
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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| 060870 | 327.2/NEW 060870 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
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| 7 |
ID:
197920
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| Publication |
New Delhi, MP-IDSA, 2025.
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| Description |
133p.pbk
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| Series |
MP-IDSA Monograph Series no; 91
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| Standard Number |
9788198080530
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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| 060868 | 303.62505491/BEH 060868 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
| 060869 | 303.62505491/BEH 060869 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
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| 8 |
ID:
197919
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| Publication |
New Delhi, MP-IDSA, 2025.
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| Description |
120p.pbk
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| Series |
MP-IDSA Monograph Series no; 89
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| Standard Number |
9788198080561
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| 060866 | 004.67/SAM 060866 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
| 060867 | 004.67/SAM 060867 | Main | On Shelf | General | | | | | | | |
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| 9 |
ID:
197918
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| 10 |
ID:
197917
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| 11 |
ID:
197916
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| 12 |
ID:
197915
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| 13 |
ID:
197914
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| 14 |
ID:
197913
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| 15 |
ID:
197912
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| Summary/Abstract |
The underrepresentation of women in top leadership positions may result in a potential loss in efficiency. In this study, we examine gender differences in leadership emergence and efficiency when a leadership task is framed as authority or responsibility. In a public good game, the group leader is entitled to punish low contributors among the group members in order to increase the group welfare. The experimental design includes a basic treatment—framing the leader's task as authority or responsibility—in occasions where group leaders emerge through self-promotion or voting. We find a more pronounced framing effect among females compared to males. Although women are generally less willing and less voted to lead than men, the responsibility framing enhances female leaders' effectiveness to a larger extent than male leaders': they contribute more to the public good, and are more inclined to punish low contributors when they are voted as leaders. Therefore, when leadership tasks emphasize responsibility, female leaders could enhance social welfare in the provision of public goods.
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| 16 |
ID:
197911
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| Summary/Abstract |
Improving consumers' ongoing participation in physical activity is crucial to enhance consumer well-being. While many consumers may begin an exercise program, sustaining their continued participation often presents a significant challenge. This study tests the effectiveness of providing different ex post feedback reminders to motivate consumers' ongoing exercise. We developed feedback reminders across two dimensions. One dimension varied the feedback messages according to whether the messages attributed performance to participants' own efforts, and the other dimension used different personal pronouns to examine whether the deictic relational framing of the feedback mattered. We developed an exercise recording application embedded in WeChat to conduct an 8-week longitudinal field experiment in China. We find that when feedback messages were provided, participants in the “I/We” frame and “You frame + effort emphasized” treatment groups achieved their weekly exercise goals more frequently, especially for subjects with low self-regulation. However, when feedback was no longer provided, the influence of the “You frame + effort emphasized” treatment was even reversed.
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| 17 |
ID:
197910
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| Summary/Abstract |
Strategyproof mechanisms have become the predominant choice for educational institutions. However, both laboratory experiments and empirical evidence highlight the persistent occurrence of strategic misreporting, leading to adverse consequences. This underscores the need to examine the reporting strategies of students, particularly those with varying cognitive abilities, across different decision environments. We present an experimental comprehension test of reporting strategies using computerized opponents to precisely control the levels of strategic uncertainty. The results reveal that removing strategic uncertainty does not significantly affect truth-telling rates. However, subjects with median cognitive ability are more truthful under strategic uncertainty, especially when information is incomplete. Additionally, providing information about priorities has a negative and significant impact on truth-telling rates. The findings of this research demonstrate that constructing a simplified market environment using computerized agents and providing relevant feedback to students can effectively enhance their understanding of the matching mechanism and nudge them to make optimal strategy choices.
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| 18 |
ID:
197909
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study explores the impacts of CEO-to-employee pay disparity on investor behavior and market dynamics using an experimental methodology. We employed two laboratory asset markets with identical company valuations but differing CEO-employee pay ratios. Our findings reveal that a higher pay ratio leads investors to quote higher prices for the company's stock. This effect is driven by two conflicting mechanisms of social preference: inequality aversion, which motivates investors who value fairness to quote lower prices for stocks of companies with high pay ratios, and social comparison, where the high pay ratio prompts investors to compare their wealth with that of CEOs, thus becoming more risk-seeking and quoting higher prices. Moreover, higher pay ratios contribute to increased stock prices, fostering larger market bubbles, enhancing the dispersion of investor opinions, boosting trading volumes, and escalating market volatility. This study enriches our understanding of how asset markets react to CEO-to-employee pay disparities, providing valuable insights for policymakers and market participants.
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| 19 |
ID:
197908
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| Summary/Abstract |
We explore how visual attention differentially impacts the trading behavior of men and women. In the laboratory, eye-tracking technology measures information gaze during a sequential trading game in which participants are asked to buy or sell an asset. Before making a decision, traders receive information on the trading decisions of other participants (others' decisions) and the redemption value of the asset (private information). Research documents that women, compared to men, pay more attention to social cues. In this study, women are more attention-driven when making financial decisions, as compared to men. We conclude that attentional priority is a cognitive mechanism that can account for the increased tendency of women, compared to men, to follow the social cues of others with disparate information and tournament incentives.
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| 20 |
ID:
197907
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| Summary/Abstract |
We examine the intergenerational transmission of economic preferences among physicians by analyzing the altruistic and risk preferences of medical students and one of their parents through incentivized experiments in Wuhan. Our findings reveal that altruism in parents is a strong predictor of similar traits in their children, demonstrating the intergenerational transmission of pro-social traits. Moreover, these children are more likely to choose a medical major, reflecting a tendency to self-select into the medical field based on altruistic inclinations. This self-selection effect has been augmented post-pandemic. These medical families are more likely to form a distinct family cluster characterized by higher levels of risk-taking and altruistic preferences. We propose a theoretical framework capturing the intergenerational preference transmission and family-wise self-selection among future physicians. Our research has important policy implications, suggesting that enhancing intra-household support can effectively address the chronic labor shortfall in the medical industry.
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