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| 1 |
ID:
164498
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article makes the case for feminist IR to build knowledge of international institutions. It emerges from a roundtable titled ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Feminist IR: Researching Gendered Institutions’ which took place at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in Baltimore in 2017. Here, we engage in self-reflexivity, drawing on our conversation to consider what it means for feminist scholars to ‘study up’. We argue that feminist IR conceptions of narratives and the everyday make a valuable contribution to feminist institutionalist understandings of the formal and informal. We also draw attention to the value of postcolonial approaches and multi-site analyses of international institutions for creating a counter-narrative to hegemonic accounts emerging from both the institutions themselves, and scholars studying them without a critical feminist perspective. In so doing, we draw attention to the salience of considering not just what we study as feminist International Relations scholars but how we study it.
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| 2 |
ID:
164497
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on ironic narrative forms in international media and policy debates concerning political developments in Turkey during the era of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in the 2000s. More specifically, the article examines the narrative of ‘losing’ Turkey, which has grown in significance during the AKP era, and argues that the metaphor also contains an ironic, self-critical reading that contributes to the debate on the idea of the West. The article advances knowledge concerning different functions of ironic narratives, proposing that we need to distinguish between (1) radical irony and (2) conservative irony. It is argued that radical irony is an outward-looking strategy to advance social justice and to challenge the Western self’s hegemonic representations, while conservative irony is an attempt to re-strengthen the Western self’s hegemony in the international system. The debate on ‘losing’ Turkey is an illustrative case where a Western subject is intersubjectively imagined and narrated with moral and aesthetic preferences. It can be seen as a negotiation about the moral traditions that underpin the West as an imagined and narrated social system. The article argues that the Western self is partly constituted through ironic narrative forms.
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| 3 |
ID:
164496
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the last 30 years, post-structuralist, feminist and other IR theorists have asked questions of the ways in which discourses on sovereignty seek to foreclose political possibility. To do so, they have advanced a decentralised, contested, incomplete and relational understanding of politics that presupposes some sort of intersubjective agency, however fragmented. There is one site, however, that appears to confound this line of argument insofar as it is commonly understood to exemplify an entirely non-relational, anti-political ‘desolation’: the concentration camp. Drawing on feminist theory to establish the terms of an aesthetic mode of ‘interruption’, this article will identify a compelling challenge to this position in a comic book drawn by Horst Rosenthal, a German–Jewish detainee at Gurs in Vichy, France, who was later killed at Auschwitz–Birkenau. Rosenthal’s piece will be read as an ‘aesthetic interruption’ that mounts a powerful critique of the logic underpinning his concentrationary experience, and in so doing demonstrates one way in which (to however painfully limited a degree) the political might be ‘brought back in’ to discussions about sovereign power.
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| 4 |
ID:
164495
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| Summary/Abstract |
China as a victim rather than a proponent of modern colonialism is an essential myth that animates Chinese nationalism. The Chinese statist project of occupying, minoritizing and securitizing different ethno-national peoples of Central Asia, such as Uyghurs and Tibetans, with their own claims to homelands, is a colonial project. Focusing on China’s securitized and militarized rule in Xinjiang and Tibet, the article will argue that the most appropriate lens through which this can be understood is neither nation-building nor internal colonialism but modern colonialism. It argues that the representation of Uyghurs and Tibetans as sources of insecurity not only legitimizes state violence as a securitizing practice but also serves contemporary Chinese colonial goals.
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| 5 |
ID:
164494
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since spring 2017, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented re-education campaign. According to media and informant reports, untold thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslims have been and are being detained in clandestine political re-education facilities, with major implications for society, local economies and ethnic relations. Considering that the Chinese state is currently denying the very existence of these facilities, this paper investigates publicly available evidence from official sources, including government websites, media reports and other Chinese internet sources. First, it briefly charts the history and present context of political re-education. Second, it looks at the recent evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of ‘de-extremification’ work. Finally, it evaluates detailed empirical evidence pertaining to the present re-education drive. With Xinjiang as the ‘core hub’ of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing appears determined to pursue a definitive solution to the Uyghur question.
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| 6 |
ID:
164493
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| Summary/Abstract |
In Your Western Regions, My Turkestan (2007), Chinese dissident Wang Lixiong warned of the ‘Palestinization’ of the Xinjiang question, defined as reaching ‘a critical point in time’ where Uyghurs and Han Chinese enter an interminable ‘ethnic war’. Following the knife attack on Han civilians in Kunming (2014), seen by many as an act of Uyghur terror, Wang reminded us that he had foreseen this trajectory seven years earlier. This article outlines Wang’s six interpretations of ‘Palestinization’ in the Xinjiang context, then shows how tightened regulations on religion and intrusive religious policing was the main catalyst for local retaliatory violence in 2012–2015. I contend that state securitization of religion was counterproductive, heightening societal insecurity and promoting inter-ethnic conflict between Uyghur and Han communities. In Chen Quanguo’s era of ‘de-extremification’, the state’s purported attempt to ‘purify’ Islamic practice continues to be experienced on the ground as violation of pure, halal space.
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| 7 |
ID:
164492
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| Summary/Abstract |
The official Chinese view of the Uyghur Islamic revival is overwhelmingly dominant. Because of the extraordinary measures taken to shield from international view the actual developments in the region and to silence Uyghur voices, we lack a clear sense of what it is to be a Muslim in contemporary Xinjiang. This article explores debates within Uyghur society about faith, politics and identity as they are revealed through the social media platform WeChat. It aims to disrupt the dominant narratives and enable new understandings of the changing patterns of religiosity and violence in the region. It focuses on the use of social media to access affective experiences of religion, projects of self-fashioning, and the new geographies of knowledge and experience formed as Uyghurs turned to the readily available scripts circulating in the wider Islamic world and adapted them to a very local sense of crisis.
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| 8 |
ID:
164491
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the past few years there has been a rise of inter-ethnic violence in China. While ethno-cultural repression and ineffective state policies are correctly attributed as key culprits behind this reality, this article suggests that socio-economic factors play a fundamental contributory role as well. Using the Xinjiang case, the article maps ethnic tensions and violence as a manifestation and expression of a growing and heightened ethno-cultural consciousness stemming from ethnic minorities’ low socio-economic status due, in part, to internal Han migration, and a labour market process – involving agency and structure – that has shaped a split and segmented labour market.
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| 9 |
ID:
164490
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| Summary/Abstract |
China has declared a war on terrorism in Xinjiang, identifying violence in the region as a top security threat. However, what nowadays is officially constructed as ‘terrorism’ was framed as ‘counter-revolution’ in the past. Informed by the concept of macrosecuritization and the agenda of critical terrorism studies, this article examines the changing nature of Chinese state framing of violence in Xinjiang. Through a comparative analysis of the discursive construction of the Baren (1990) and Maralbeshi (2013) violent incidents, I find that the terror lexicon has replaced old narratives of counter-revolution to legitimize a sustained crackdown under a novel geopolitical context. The construction of violence in Xinjiang as terrorism, I argue, is contingent, limited and unstable. It marginalizes factors other than an extremist or separatist agency in the incubation of the violence, in particular the frictions created by the crackdown with which the Chinese government is trying to placate the unrest.
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| 10 |
ID:
164489
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the Introduction to this special issue, I first provide an overview of the programme of 'de-extremification' and mass internment in Xinjiang since early 2017. I then situate this development against the ‘ideological turn’ in Chinese Communist Party policy under President Xi Jinping, highlighting the new emphasis on stability maintenance and ideational governance. Next, I explore experiences of (in)security in Uyghur communities in- and outside of Xinjiang in the era of internment to consider how far PRC counter-terrorism initiatives have now evolved into state terror. In doing so, I apply Ruth Blakeley's (2012) definition of state terror as a deliberate act of violence against civilians, or threat of violence where a climate of fear is already established by earlier acts of violence; as perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state; as intended to induce extreme fear in target observers who identify with the victim; and as forcing the target audience to consider changing its behaviour. Finally, I discuss the six contributions to the special issue.
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| 11 |
ID:
164488
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| Publication |
Singapore, Lorenz Books, 2009.
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| Description |
256p.: ill.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780754818991
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy |
| 059595 | 294.3/HAR 059595 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books |
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| 12 |
ID:
164487
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas (ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The ‘grey zone’ notion raises two issues. Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing’s strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to control ‘rights and interests’ are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and is therefore better described as part of a ‘hybrid’ strategy.
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| 13 |
ID:
164486
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| Summary/Abstract |
In contemporary international security, some powers try to challenge the status quo through gradual, sub-threshold expansion without resorting to the explicit use of force. Examples of such sub-threshold challenges can be seen in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Eastern Europe. They are now referred to as ‘gray zone’ or ‘hybrid threat’. For a long time deterrence theory, a core component of strategic studies, has largely neglected such sub-threshold challenges. The exceptional part of that is empirical school’s findings, including fait accompli, limited probe, and controlled pressure. They perfectly match with the current threats and help developing conceptual framework to deter these kind of threats. Based on these findings, this paper attempted to illustrate three principles for gray zone deterrence: combination of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, mobilization of the whole government assets, and keeping open the window to escalation and analyze, Japan’s efforts to develop conceptual framework for gray zone deterrence. Since Japan’s efforts to develop conceptual framework of gray zone deterrence dates further back than other part of the world, as the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2010, a case study on Japan would provide useful insights for gray zone deterrence.
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| 14 |
ID:
164485
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses hybrid warfare as a framework for examining North Korean operations on the Korean Peninsula and the South Korean reaction to such operations. It argues that North Korea has long employed a hybrid approach to achieve a wide number of political and strategic objectives. However, the deterrence-based strategic reality on the Korean Peninsula in combination with North Korea’s increasing relative weaknesses has rendered this approach self-defeating.
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| 15 |
ID:
164484
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the manifestation and trends of hybrid warfare in the Asia-Pacific region through the lenses of the following three key hybrid actors: China, North Korea and ISIS affiliates in Southeast Asia. This article explains why the hybrid approach can be such an attractive strategic option for both state and non-state actors in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, this paper will address the impact of how the constant pushing of boundaries in hybrid warfare can lead to unintended consequences.
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| 16 |
ID:
164483
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| Summary/Abstract |
For generations, most analysts treated state and nonstate war making as a dichotomy, with states employing high-intensity ‘conventional’ methods centered on seizing and holding ground, but with nonstate actors using low-intensity ‘irregular’ methods such as roadside bombings, ambushes, and assassinations. This article, by contrast, argues that many nonstate actors have adopted substantially conventional warfighting styles, and that more are likely to do so over time. Increasingly, the best predictor of a combatant’s military methods is not its status as a state as opposed to a nonstate actor, but its internal politics – and especially its institutional maturity and war aims.
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| 17 |
ID:
164482
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| Summary/Abstract |
This special issue explores how and to what extent ‘hybridity’ informs national policy, doctrines, and military transformation in Asia. The introduction engages with three preliminary issues as a way to set the broader analytical context. It reviews the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ to make the case that versions of this notion have long been a feature of regional strategic thinking and practice. It similarly argues that maritime geography has had an impact on how ‘hybrid’ courses of actions in the region have been conceptualised, notably in regards to ‘grey zone’ operations. Lastly, it reviews the question of how to engage with the issue of the effectiveness of such strategies.
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| 18 |
ID:
164480
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| Summary/Abstract |
Libya after 42 years of Gaddafi’s autocratic and “Green Book” driven rule was hankering for some kind of liberation and the youth wanted to freely fly . Hence when the so called ‘Arab Spring” happened in 2010 Libyans were willing to see a better change and create a “New Libya” of their dreams . Gaddafi was unpopular with the Arab and western leaders because of his independent occasional waywardness in the international discourse which was not palatable to the global and regional powers that were calling the shots in the UN and outside. Hence an engineered revolution supported by external military intervention aimed at removal of Gaddafi ensued but without any plan for the future because of which the seeds of current disastrous developments were implanted. All this became known in a few years thereafter and Libyan’s continued instability follows on. As for India which had good relations with Libya all through did not support the military intervention at the UNSC hence it was on the wrong side of the manufactured history and revolution and paid the price as popular dissatisfaction with India’s approach became visible in day to day discourse especially at the popular level. To correct the skewed perception was the immediate task of the new Ambassador and to secure India’s commercial interests the next despite the fluid security situation. Unfortunately the “New Libya” dream of common Libyans shattered in no time.
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| 19 |
ID:
164479
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Iraqi invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 exposed the soft underbelly of India’s policy toward the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf region in particular. While safe evacuation of the Indian workers was a prime concern, some of the steps in that direction proved counterproductive. However, in the long run, the Kuwait crisis resulted in India making two critical steps that shaped its post-Cold War policy toward the region: diminishing influence of the Palestinian cause in its engagements with the Arab world and economic substance replacing political rhetoric.
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| 20 |
ID:
164478
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the inception of the Baha’ism as an independent faith in Persia, its adherents came under attack from the religious clergy which perceived the growing popularity of this new faith as a threat to their monopolistic position in the society. Education and economy were the two dominant fields where the Baha’is prospered in pre-revolution Iran, thereby contributing to the modernization of Persia. However, being a post-Abrahamic faith in its origin, the Islamic clergy viewed the Baha’is as apostates and an enemy of Islam, which led to the persistent targeting and attacks on the Baha’is over the faith’s origin and as an essentially incompatible and contradictory disposition in the Baha’i–ulema relations. While the pre-revolution Iran show an ulema–monarchy convergence in their attack on the Baha’is, the post-revolution Iran witnessed the same through consolidation of state–ulema powers in the form of the new Islamic Republic. The discrimination and persecutions of the Baha’is in the post-1979 Iran increased considerably, and one can witness a deviation of the homogenous perception on the Baha’is by the religious clergy class. The conservative reformist faction of the ulema has given rise to newer and opposing perspectives on the Baha’is, the largest non-recognized religious minority in Iran.
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