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| 1 |
ID:
195548
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay addresses the imperative need for a comprehensive American, if not Western strategy to support Ukraine. This strategy must include not only the current tranche of weapons but also consistent and regular supply to achieve victory, i.e., restoration of the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine. Equally important is the necessity for Washington and its allies to collaborate on the long-term preservation and sustainment of conventional deterrence in Europe at the Russo-NATO border. In addition, the Administration must make the case for Ukraine to the public.
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| 2 |
ID:
195547
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaches its 75th- year anniversary, it is important to reflect on the past, examine the present, and to imagine the future of the alliance. NATO has had periodic self-reflections in the past, including the influential 1967 Harmel Report. Importantly, the report laid out the rationale for a dual-track NATO policy that would retain a strong deterrence posture while moving toward a détente with the Soviet Union and later toward cooperation with Russia. While Russia’s war against Ukraine rages, it is impossible to return to a more cooperative relationship with Russia. Yet, NATO’s history demonstrates that conflict with Russia is not inevitable. In any case, only a strong NATO can prevent that conflict and provide stability to the transatlantic region.
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| 3 |
ID:
195546
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| Summary/Abstract |
Contrary to the prevailing view, messianic thinking has not driven Russian expansionism. Russian rulers have rather been guided by realpolitik in a search for security through the creation of strategic depth. When messianic thinking has infected Russian conduct abroad it generally has led to humiliating setbacks. In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has abandoned realpolitik for messianic thinking. Such thinking lay behind his decision to invade Ukraine. It informs his escalating conflict with the West. And it will likely produce no better results for Russia than messianic thinking has in the past. This article is a slightly edited excerpt from the author’s new book, Getting Russia Right.
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| 4 |
ID:
195545
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| Summary/Abstract |
The ongoing crisis in the Middle East can be understood as the intersection of three developments. The first is Iran’s strategy of forward defense, a style of warfighting that effectively combines material, psychological, and physical elements and has been enabled by regional political developments. The second is Israel’s ongoing political crisis—long in the making—which handicapped Israel’s ability to maintain credibility in the face of the growing threats on all its borders. The third is the uncertainty of US strategy in the Middle East, which has been unable to find a formula for even its medium-term engagement with the region. This article uses these three trends to create a frame of reference for the current crisis.
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| 5 |
ID:
195544
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes Iran’s Shia Imamate project that shapes its proxy war strategy. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s (IRI) indirect surrogate warfare doctrine is discussed in three stages. First, the historical forces behind Tehran’s proxy war approach and ideological factors that drive it are analyzed. Second, the historical execution of its militia strategy is examined; and third, the consequences of the Iranian-Hezbollah military entrenchment in Syria and its impact on the October 2023 Gaza War are assessed. The author concludes that Iran and its Shia proxies are poorly positioned to sustain a regional war against Israel to save Hamas.
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| 6 |
ID:
195543
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States’ deterrence strategy against the Islamic Republic of Iran has not yielded desired outcomes to meet mission objectives. Iranian-backed groups have taken advantage of the Israel-Hamas war and Washington’s preoccupation with both the Russia-Ukraine war and China. Iraqi groups and Yemen’s Houthis have rebranded and adapted to the new operational environmental that has unfolded in the region, due largely to the war in Israel. Policymakers should consider a strategy that goes beyond deterrence that includes partnerships, greater interagency coordination, and imposing costs with offensive measures.
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| 7 |
ID:
195542
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| Summary/Abstract |
While rising geopolitical competition poses significant political challenges for future arms control negotiations, it also complicates national arms control verification by making on-site inspections unlikely. One way to verify future arms control agreements without on-site inspections would be to rely on counting rules verified by national technical intelligence. American policymakers should consider how they might combine on-site inspections and counting rules in future arms control agreements. By allowing each party to choose its verification modality, future arms control agreements could cater to different security preferences while also preserving areas of American military advantage.
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| 8 |
ID:
195541
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rapid pace of novel technological change, referred to as “emerging technologies,” is challenging our ability to devise policy and governance apace. This is particularly true in the life sciences and biotechnology, where the current tools used for promoting biosecurity via policy and governance are becoming outdated.
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| 9 |
ID:
195540
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines a potential, and increasingly aggressive satellite posture in outer space by way of increased presence of adversary satellites, unilateral technological advancements by the adversary, and an increase of cyber-attacks on autonomous space systems; including an inquiry into “salami tactics” in outer space. First, it considers the proposed category of inferential ASAT and distinguishes it from traditional categorizations of counterspace threats. It then delves into the theoretical construct of deterrence theory by considering two tenets most implicated by inferential capabilities: signaling and credibility. Finally, the essay expands upon Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Aerospace Security Project’s 2021 Report, wherein a US military satellite is compromised by an allegedly rouge Chinese satellite. It concludes by offering options for successful deterrence in outer space given the scenario.
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| 10 |
ID:
195539
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States, and more broadly, the West, is prone to be surprised. We are surprised by China’s pursuit of hegemony through economic and military means; by Russia’s engaging in the largest conventional war in Europe since 1945; by the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. We think that economic sanctions will fundamentally alter the calculus of our enemies—even deter a potential attack—and we are puzzled when they do not. The recent streak of surprises is not a fluke of history, an unlucky combination of events. This article contends that our surprise is due to a series of illusions that characterize our foreign policy vision. These illusions stem from a mistaken series of assumptions about the causes of political order and about the drivers of political behavior.
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| 11 |
ID:
195538
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay is written as an open letter to whomever the 47th President may be and whenever he or she may take office. It proposes several different approaches to a presidential transition to allow an incoming President to have a strategy and other plans in place sooner than has been the norm over the past several transitions to direct the national security system more effectively. While the 2024 presidential election may feature the reelection of the current incumbent or the return of the previous president to the Oval Office, either may wish to consider new approaches to how they will organize their national security strategy and the personnel and processes that will manage it from the way they did in their first administrations.
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| 12 |
ID:
195537
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| Summary/Abstract |
The energy transition is initiating long-term oil market trends that look likely to undermine the strategic importance of oil-producing countries for the US government. The trends suggest US voters and future US administrations will be less exposed to price swings and other risks in the global oil market. Diminishing risk exposure, in turn, reduces imperatives for US policymakers to spend so heavily on security provision in the Persian Gulf, or to resolve diplomatic rifts with major producers such as Saudi Arabia. Saudi policy changes since 2016, and the reduced willingness to use spare production capacity in ways that benefit Washington, may have amplified a pre-existing appetite for such a downgrade.
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| 13 |
ID:
195536
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the relationship between masculinity and national security. There may be a reluctance to view the values, attitudes, and beliefs associated with a particular version of masculinity as a driver for violence. Yet, the “real man” version of masculinity is consistently correlated with those who in engage in mass violence, mobilized violence, and violent extremism—which present a threat to national security. The “real man” identity is also correlated with significant gender disparities in quality of life including income, health, happiness, and mortality for men. Such grievances represent yet another driver of discontent and violence. National security requires that we recognize and understand potential threats and subsequently work to mitigate those threats. Men in the US military have traditionally been viewed as prototypical of masculine identity and its associated values, attitudes, and beliefs. As such, this version of masculinity represents a unique institutional context to examine the “real man” version of masculinity, and to advance gender equality and overcome the harms that rigid gender roles present to national security.
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| 14 |
ID:
195535
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| Summary/Abstract |
The failure to anticipate Hamas’s brutal attack on October 7 is multilayered and will be investigated for years to come. However, the preliminary consensus has blamed the konceptcia, the Hebrew word for paradigm, that guided the intelligence and security forces. With the advent of AI and its complex search algorithms, the resultant paradigm was shaped by an input imbalance that depicted Hamas transitioning from its jihadist past to a rational governance player. The politicization of the academic and lay Middle East discourse legitimized resistance to Israel, feeding the bias. Equally, the virtual absence of understanding of the military wing of Hamas and its role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance deepened the imbalance.
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| 15 |
ID:
195534
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| 16 |
ID:
195533
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States no longer constitutes a monolith in determining Africa’s future. In fact, no single country does—not Russia, not China. Africa has options, well noted in welcome statements by Department of State Secretary Antony Blinken: “Africa does not need to pick sides.” Africans see double standards in US policy (“do as we say, not as we do”). Understandably, they turn to other options in seeking better outcomes for their countries. Partners such as the Russian Federation may seem unsavory to the United States, but rhetoric alone will not persuade Africans to drop them. High-level VIP visits leave them largely indifferent. Private sector investment could succeed where public efforts leave a dubious record. If US investors can overcome risk aversion, they may supplant or complement a public sector that Africans find unresponsive to their needs and wishes. Encouraged and energized, US investors could meet Africa’s challenges, and mutually benefit from its rewards.
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| 17 |
ID:
195532
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States Embassy Harare needs to identify innovative ways to affect systems-level changes that advance US interests in Zimbabwe.1 Domestic and foreign laws, plans, policies, programs, regulations, standards, and strategies can serve as inspiration for such innovation in its strategic planning process. This article reports the findings of a novel analysis conducted on the linkages that are declared in the Integrated Country Strategy Zimbabwe (ICS Zimbabwe) and the Integrated Country Strategy Malawi (ICS Malawi). Among other things, it finds that the US Embassy Harare declared far fewer linkages than the US. Embassy Lilongwe. These are puzzling findings. The US Embassy Harare needs to work with a large number of horizontal, vertical, and diagonal partners in order to achieve its own goals and objectives. Why then are there so few linkages declared in its country-level foreign policy plan? Is it because the U.S. foreign policy planning process is poorly designed? Or, is it because the U.S. foreign policy planning process is poorly managed? The United States Congress possesses the oversight powers to seek answers to those questions. On the basis of this exploratory study, the author recommends that it makes use of them.
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| 18 |
ID:
195531
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since gaining independence in 1980 and changing its name from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, this southern African nation has been plagued with political violence and economic instability. Corrupt and incompetent officials, mostly from the ruling ZANU-PF party, have caused bouts of rampant inflation which turned into hyperinflation, wrecking what had once been a thriving economy. After a period of relative economic stability from 2009 to 2016, the economy appears once again to be in a tailspin. The overthrow of long-time leader Robert Mugabe in 2017 was seen initially as ushering in a new era, but elections in 2018 and 2023—were flawed by official intimidation and corruption. The United States is not positioned to have a significant impact on Zimbabwe’s future trajectory. However, it should take a more clear-eyed approach to do what little it can given the current global context. At a minimum, this requires the production of a realistic strategic plan, which in turn requires important strategic choices to be made, including what is the winning aspiration being sought in US-Zimbabwe relations.
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| 19 |
ID:
195530
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| Summary/Abstract |
After decades of benign neglect, followed by a four-year period of outright disdain, the United States finally announced on August 8, 2022, a policy towards the continent of Africa that seemed to herald an era of treating the countries of Africa with respect and dignity, and acknowledging African agency in our bilateral and multilateral dealings. The question is whether the countries of Africa take this newly announced attitude seriously and will they act accordingly. Is the US position in Africa on a solid foundation, or are we witnessing a shift in global alliances with this significant portion of the global south moving closer to those who are not our friends? The large number of African countries abstaining on the United Nations votes calling for a Russian pullout from Ukraine or condemning Russia for the invasion have exposed cracks in African solidarity with the so-called West. But is this a new phenomenon, or an indication of the way things have always been?
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| 20 |
ID:
195529
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